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RESOLVING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES: A GUIDE FOR WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLES MATTHEW KINCAID*

PART ONE
I.

INTRODUCTION

At a press conference on March 11, 1969, Arch A. Moore, Jr.,
Governor of the State of West Virginia, dramatically announced
that he was discharging over 3000 non-civil-service employees of
the State Road Commission for engaging in a strike which arguably had left public highways unsafe for travel during inclement
weather. While the motivation behind Governor Moore's decision
has been subject to debate,' the legality of this discharge of nontenured state employees was supported in a subsequent court opinion.' The incident illustrates a political decision which was once
* A.B., Marshall University, 1968; J.D., West Virginia University, 1973;
LL.M., Georgetown University, 1977. This article was written while Mr. Kincaid
was employed by the National Labor Relations Board.
I Those persons skeptical of the motivation behind Governor Moore's massive
discharge suspected that the snowfall of March 11, 1969, was used as a pretext for
activating a large portion of what was left of the West Virginia spoils system. For
an account of the sequence of events leading to the collective discharge see Kirker
v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
In a later, unrelated case, in which the discharged non-civil-service manager
of a state liquor store sued the Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner, the district
court reluctantly sanctioned use of the West Virginia political patronage system,
noting that '.[t]hose who, figuratively speaking, live by the political sword must
be prepared to die by the political sword."' Nunnery v. Barber, 365 F. Supp. 691,
695 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
1005 (1975), quoting from AFSCME v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 536, 280 A.2d 375, 378
(1971).
2 Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.W. Va. 1970). In Kirker, Lyle Kirker,
an official of the Laborers' District Council of Charleston, West Virginia, sued
Governor Moore and other persons on behalf of the discharged employees, who had
signed authorization cards designating the Laborers' District Council of Charleston
as their exclusive collective bargaining representative. Prior to the filing of this
lawsuit, Kirker had met with State Road Commissioner Ritchie and apparently had
stated that he desired to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit
of district council members. Chief Judge Field of the district court sustained
Governor Moore's discharge decision on the ground that the state employees had
been engaged in a strike which was both illegal under common law and not protected by any constitutional guarantee and on the basis that the lawsuit was against
the State of West Virginia and, therefore, was prohibited by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Id.
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possible in most states before the advent of civil service job security and, more importantly, reflects the remnant of a rather onesided approach to labor-management relations which has helped
spur recent radical changes in the nature of the public employeremployee relationship.
Have public employee unions gone too far in their demands?
Should some or all public employees have the right to strike and
for what purposes and when? How are disputes between governmental bodies and their employees effectively resolved? What
rights and obligations belong to governmental employees, the public, and the government? What is the relationship between public
sector collective bargaining and a civil service system? What is the
scope of public sector collective bargaining? What have been the
effects of public employee unionization and the resultant collective
bargaining? These are some of the broad questions which have
been a motivating factor in the development of this paper.
In discussing possible answers to the questions just posed, this
paper will concentrate solely on state and local governments and
will analyze how they have approached their new roles as public
managers obligated, by law or by practicalities, to deal with public
employee unions. Emphasis will be placed on how management
and labor in the public sector resolve their differences, with a focus
on the role of arbitration in settling disputes.
Before proceeding to an analysis of various mechanisms used
to resolve employer-employee disputes in the public arena, a
rather lengthy overview of public sector labor-management relations is necessary to place dispute resolution in perspective. This
approach is required due to the fetal state of development of government labor-management relations in West Virginia.
H.

PERSPECTIVES

A. A Statistical Overview
Public employment relations today is a cauldron bubbling
with activity. Since the early 1960's, an ever increasing number of
states and local governments have enacted collective bargaining
statutes governing public employees. With the onslaught of legislation combined with intensive organizational activity, membership
in public employee labor unions has grown to the point that the
public sector is more unionized than the private sector.'
Approximately 25 percent of all private wage and salary workers belong to
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It probably seems ironical that West Virginia, which is considered to have the most unionized private sector, has one of the least
unionized state governments. Factors which seem likely to be responsible for this irony are the lack of sizable urban communities;
the essentially rural character of the populace; strong resistance
from governmental decision-makers; a civil service system designed to ameliorate abuses of public management; the lack of
growth in the number of state employees until recent years; a lack
of cohesiveness within public employee associations, exclusive of
teacher associations; a generally accepted unwillingness on the
part of state employees to strike; and the absence of legislation
conducive to public employee unionization. 5 Caveat: these are suplabor unions. By comparison, in 1970, 38 percent of all full-time state and local
government employees, excluding teachers and transit workers, were unionized. Of
course, teachers, who compose about one-fourth of all state and local government
employees, are even more unionized, considering their traditional affiliations with
the National Education Association and with the newer, more activist American
Federation of Teachers. In cities of 10,000 or more population, approximately 60
percent of all public employees are represented by unions or associations, with
many of the major cities being totally unionized. J. STEIBER, PUBLIc EMPLOYEE
UNIONISM 1-13 (1973).
Much of the union activities during the 1960's may well have been a reaction
to the rapidly expanding number of state and local government employees; for
example, between 1963 and 1968, their numbers swelled from 6.87 million to 9.42
million persons. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1968,
at 451 (1969).
In order of degree of unionization are these state governments (numbers show
percentage of state workers [presumably excluding teachers] in collective bargaining organizations, according to the 1972 Census of Governments): Hawaii-85.8;
Pennsylvania-85.2; Connecticut-79.8; Oregon-76.1; New York-68.0; California-62.4; Rhode Island-61.2; Maine-57.3; Michigan-54.2; Alaska-51.6; Maryland-48.1; Vermont-47.9; North Carolina-45.0; Alabama-44.8; Washington-44.4; Wyoming-43.8; Illinois-43.4; Massachusetts-43.4; Minnesota-43.3;
New Hampshire-42.8; Nevada-42.1; Delaware-40.6; New Jersey-38.7;
Idaho-38.6; Utah-37.7; Ohio-36.7; Wisconsin-35.8; Colorado-35.8; Arizona-33.2; Montana-32.5; Texas-29.7; North Dakota-29.6; South Carolina-28.7; South Dakota-28.5; Virginia-26.9; Indiana-22.6; Missouri-22.4;
Iowa-22.3; New Mexico-22.2; Louisiana-19.3; Nebraska-17.4; Kansas-15.0;
Arkansas-13.9; Tennessee-8.3; Kentucky-6.9; Oklahoma-3.8; Florida-3.2;
West Virginia-2.4; Georgia-2.0; Mississippi-1.9. STAT Gov'T NEWS, Aug. 1975,
at 3.
One author, after reviewing variables which have influenced enactment of
public sector legislation in all 50 states, concluded that West Virginia is a state
where public sector collective bargaining laws are much less comprehensive than
predicted by his analytical model. He suggested that, although private sector
unionization is high in West Virginia and per capita income has increased between
1960 and 1970, significant legislation has not developed in public employment
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positions only and remain untested. Much of the legislative lobbying concerning labor-management relations in the public sector of
West Virginia is occurring on behalf of municipal employees, especially police and firefighter groups, which consistently have exhibited a potent influence on legislative decisions.
With the increase in public sector union membership nationally have come a variety of state statutory collective bargaining'
schemes. The statutory situation as of late 1975 was as follows:,
Only nine states, including West Virginia, 8 lacked legislation;' 18
because the United Mine Workers has not transformed its potential power into
effective political effort on behalf of public employees and because there has been
active opposition to such legislation by the Governor. Kochan, Correlates of State
Public Employee BargainingLaws, 12 IND. REL. 336 n.13 (1973).
1 The term "collective bargaining," as used here, means the process of establishing terms and conditions of employment through negotiations between the public employer and the exclusive representative of the public employees contained in
the bargaining unit and memorializing the result thereof into a written agreement.
Collective bargaining is to be distinguished from "meeting and conferring," which
lacks one or more of the elements of collective bargaining. Negotiations under meet
and confer statutes usually imply employer-employee discussions leading to unilateral adoption of policies by the legislative body rather than a written contract and
take place with multiple employee representatives rather than an exclusive bargaining agent.
As will be explained infra, collective bargaining in the private sector has come
to mean that the parties meet as equals at the bargaining table and are free to
discuss all matters which relate to wages, hours, and working conditions. Mandatory subjects of bargaining may be negotiated to the point of impasse since neither
side is required to make concessions, but permissive subjects may not be insisted
upon to impasse. Practically speaking, since the mandatory subject concept has
been construed so liberally, the parties are free, in effect, to negotiate upon virtually
all major matters concerning the employment relationship.
It is readily assumed that most states have opted for the private sector collective negotiations model rather than the meet and confer approach. In actuality,
many states have rejected pure versions of either model. Although some persons
view meet and confer statutes as collective begging, not collective bargaining in any
sense of the word, one author believes that recent experience shows "there is little
to support the notion that there is any wide-spread difference in tactic or technique
in the bargaining processes under these two models. ... [U]nions in the public
sector have pressed for the same type of demands and with the same vigor under
both statutory bargaining models." Edwards, An Overview of the "Meet and Confer" States-Where Are We Going?, 16 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 10-15 (1972).
' In addition to the official code of each state see C. MAGEL, GUIDE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS (1974); 51 GERR, RF 1011.
6027 (1975).
Although West Virginia has no general legislation governing the public sector
collective bargaining relationship (there are, of course, civil service statutes and
other statutes related to wages, pensions, working conditions, etc.), guidance from
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states and the District of Columbia had comprehensive statutes
requiring broad-scope collective bargaining for many state and
local government employees;'" five states had comprehensive statthe attorney general has been consistent since the 1930's. For example, Attorney
General Robertson concluded:
In summary, you are advised that the right of collective bargaining,
closed shop, strike, etc., does not exist with employees of government at
the state, county, or municipal level in West Virginia. All public employees, however, have the right to join any association or labor organization
of their own choosing and cannot be discriminated against because of
such membership. The final determination of wages, hours, working conditions and the like, rests with the particular governmental unit and
cannot be delegated away. However, recognition of a union, professional
teaching association, nonteaching association, or association representing
the employees, is legally permissible and in many instances highly desirable. Surely no one can object, legally or in good conscience, to the right
of public officials to discuss wages, hours, working conditions and policies
with their public employees or their duly- constituted chosen representatives. These matters should be, and are, subject for reasonable negotiation.
49 Op. W. VA. Arr'y GEN. 448, 452 (1962).
1 Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Louisiana, while lacking collective bargaining legislation, does provide for union dues checkoff. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:457 (Supp.
1976).

," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -478 (1972, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153a to -153h (Supp. 1976) (teachers); Conn.
Pub. A. No. 75-566, §§ 1-11 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 447.20-.607 (Supp. 1976) (public employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§
89-1 to -20 (Supp. 1975) (public employees); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14
(1975) (teachers); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-6-4-1 to -13 (Supp. 1976) (public employees); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.1-.27 (Supp. 1976) (public employees); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 751-53 (Supp. Pamphlet 1973, Supp. 1976) (state employees); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 961-73 (1964, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 979 to 979-0 (1964, Supp. 1976) (state employees); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1021-34 (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 150E, §§ 1-15 (1976) (public employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.35-.47
(1966, Supp. 1976) (charitable hospital employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61.76 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 41-2201 to -2209 (Supp. 1975) (nurses); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 59-1601 to -1617 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except nurses and professional
engineers); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -823, -837 to -838 (1974) (public employees); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1287 to -1295 (1971) (teachers); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:3 (1955) (town employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 98-C:1-:7 (Supp. 1973)
(state and nonprofessional university employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 105B:1-:14 (Supp. 1973) (local government police); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14
(McKinney 1973, McKinney Supp. 1976) (public employees); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
243.650-.782 (1975 Replacement Part) (public employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-
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utes requiring broad-scope collective bargaining for local government employees only;" Alaska had a comprehensive statute requiring broad-scope collective bargaining for state employees,
while leaving local government bargaining to the option of the
political subdivisions; 2 three states had limited forms of mandatory collective bargaining for state employees;' 3 five states had
mandatory collective bargaining statutes for specific groups of
employees;' 4 three states had mandatory meet and confer statutes;' 5 12 states in some fashion authorized collective bargaining
.2301 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters and police); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 39951 (Supp. 1976) (transit workers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1 to
-15 (1968, Supp. 1975) (firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.2-1 to -15 (1968,
Supp. 1975) (police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (1968, Supp. 1975)
(teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -19 (1968) (municipal employees
except firefighters, police, and teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 36-11-1 to -11
(1970, Supp. 1975) (state employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 3-18-1 to -17
(1974, Supp. 1976) (public employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 9-14A-1 to
-22 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.94(29) (1965) (transit
workers); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70-.77 (1974, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-.97 (1974, Supp. 1976) (state employees); 1 APP. D.C.
CODE ANN., ORG. ORD. No. 25 (1973).
" MICH. STAT. ANN. §9 17.454-.455 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.010-.280
(1975) (local government employees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 548.1-.14 (Supp.
1976) (firefighters, municipal employees, police); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 509.1.10 (1972) (school employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1721-35 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.010-.950 (1972, Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.58.005-.901 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 53.18.010-.060 (Supp. 1975) (port district employees).

§§ 23.40.070-.260 (1972).
§ § 4001-13 (1974) (certified public school employees);
tit. 19, § 802 (1974) (transportation workers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

12 ALASKA STAT.

11DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
DEL. CODE ANN.

19, 99 1301-12 (1974) (public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-1005 (1972
Replacement Edition, Cum. Supp. 1976) (state employees, state college employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28B.16.010-.230 (1970, Supp. 1975) (certain employees of state institutions of higher learning); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28B.52.010.200 (Supp. 1975) (community college academic employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.56.010-.950 (1972, Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.58.005-.901
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.59.010-.950 (Supp. 1975) (certificated
public school employees).
" GA. CODE ANN. 99 54-1301 to -1315 (1974) (firefighters in cities above 20,000);
IDAHO CODE §§ 33-1271 to -1276 (Supp. 1976) (teachers); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801 to
-1811 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.470-.480 (Supp. 1976)
(county police); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.010-.130 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 160-160A (1975 Replacement Volume, Supp. 1976)
(public school employees in certain counties); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to -273
(1967 Replacement Volume) (firefighters).
's CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500-11 (Deering 1973) (local government employees);
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3525-36 (Deering 1973) (state employees); CAL. LABOR CODE §§
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for some or all public employees or granted to public employees the
right to present proposals;' 6 and Illinois, by executive order,
granted mandatory collective bargaining for executive branch
7
employees.
Administration of public employer-employee relations has
been vested in previously established labor relations agencies,", has
been trusted to new agencies,'" and sometimes has been left to the
1960-63 (Deering 1976) (firefighters); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to -5425 (1972)
(teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4337 (Supp. 1975) (public employees
except teachers); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, national guard, police, and teachers).
,1 Alabama-ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (firefighters). Arkansas-Fort Smith v. State Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153
(1968); Op. Ark. Att'y Gen. (Sept. 19, 1972) (state and local government employees). Georgia-Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. (Sept. 1, 1966) (teachers). Idaho-Op. Idaho
Att'y Gen. (Mar. 18, 1959) (local government employees). Illinois-Chicago Div. of
Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966) (local
government employees). Indiana-IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-6-4-1 to -13 (Supp. 1976)
(public employees). Kentucky-Comm'r of Personnel, Policy Statement (Memo.
Dec. 20, 1966) (state employees); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 64-591 (1964) (local
government employees). Missouri-Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 276 (1968) (teachers).
New Mexico-Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 14, 1971) (state employees). North Dakota-N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-11-01 to -05 (1972 Replacement Volume) (public
employees). Utah-Op. Utah Att'y Gen. No. 60-003 (1960) (state employees); Op.
Utah Att'y Gen. (Oct. 1, 1945) (local employees). Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1114.5 (Supp. 1976) (grievance procedure for state employees); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.17.1 (Supp. 1976) (grievance procedure for local employees); Op. Va. Att'y Gen.
(Feb. 18, 1970) (teachers); Op. Va. Att'y Gen. (July 7, 1962) (firefighters, local
employees, police).
'7 Ill. Exec. Order No. 6 (1973).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-471 (1972) (municipal employees); Conn. Pub.
A. No. 75-566, § 4 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 150E, § 1 (1976), defining "commission"; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.454(2)(c),
.455(1)(b) (1975), defining "board"; NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-803 (1974) [the council
was "previously established" in relationship to the collective bargaining statutes,
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-837 to -838 (1974)]; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.501-.503
(Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§§ 28-9.3-4 to -6 (1968), describing functions of the State Labor Relations Board
(teachers); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-2, -4 to -7 (1968), describing functions of
the State Labor Relations Board (municipal employees); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 3611-8 (Supp. 1975), describing functions of the State Labor Relations Board (state
employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(1)(c), (4) (1974), defining and describing
powers of "commission" (municipal employees); WL. STAT. ANN. § 111.81 (1974),
defining "commission" (state employees).
"2 IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-9 (1975) (teachers); IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-6-4-10
(Supp. 1976), extending scope of Indiana Education Employment Relations Board
to govern public employee relations generally; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4323 (Supp.
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employer. 20 Generally, the functions of these agencies have been
patterned after the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
which is the dominant governing body in private sector labor relations. Indeed, it is because the NLRB is precluded by Congress
from exercising jurisdiction over employer-employee relations of
state and local governments that these governments have the authority to develop the regulatory bodies just noted. 2' In light of the
experimentation in public sector labor relations being performed
by a multiplicity of jurisdictions, it is questionable whether federal
legislation is now appropriate to provide uniformity in this area of
22
the law.
1975) (public employees except teachers); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 345.120 (Supp.
1976) (firefighters); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 751 (Supp. 1976) (state employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 968 (1964, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-A(2) (1964) (state employees), defining "board"
and thus extending scope of Public Employees Labor Relations Board to include
state employees; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,

§ 1022(2)

(Supp. 1976) (university

employees), defining "board" and thus extending scope of Public Employees Labor
Relations Board to include university employees; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.63(2)
(Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees), defining
"director" and referring to creation in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.02 (Supp. 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.71-.72 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable
hospital employees); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 288.080-.110 (1975) (local government
employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:1(III) (Supp. 1973) (state and
nonprofessional university employees), defining "commission"; N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW § 205 (McKinney 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.4-1 (Supp. 1976)
(firefighters, municipal employees, police).
SKAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5417 to -5420 (1972), describing functions of board
(teachers-state board of education); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 160-160A (1975

Replacement Volume), defining "public school employer" and describing functions
of such (public school employees in certain counties-each employer); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 41-2202, -2204, -2206 to -2208 (Supp. 1975), defining "board" and
describing functions of such (nurses-state board of health); N.D. CENT. CODE §§

15-38.1-10 to -11 (1971 Replacement Volume), describing functions of board (teachers-school board).
2! The definition of "employer" in the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 141-97 (1970) [hereinafter denoted as LMRA], expressly excludes "any
State or political subdivision thereof." LMRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
Nevertheless, the legal boundaries of the exclusion are not clear since the term
"political subdivision" is not defined in the LMRA. In attempting to clarify this
situation, the United States Supreme Court declared in NLRB v. Natural Gas
Utility Districtthat federal law determined the scope of the exclusion and that the
NLRB's construction of its own statute was entitled to great respect. However, the
Court then weighed numerous factors and disagreed with the NLRB's ruling by
concluding that the natural gas utility district was a political subdivision of Tennessee and thereby was excluded from coverage under the LMRA. 402 U.S. 600,
602-09 (1971).
22 For a lengthy discussion of this issue by both proponents and opponents see
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A Brief HistoricalPerspective

With amazing rapidity since 1961, when Wisconsin enacted
the first significant state collective bargaining statute,2 states
have initiated legislation regulating public employer-employee
labor relations. Shortly thereafter, in 1962, Federal Executive
Order No. 10,9884 provided a framework for federal employee
collective bargaining. In all, during the 1960's, 22 states passed
statutes concerning collective bargaining rights of state or local
employees with slightly less than that number approving similar
legislation in the 1970's.2
To place these recent legislative activities in perspective, a
glance at the past is appropriate. 2 As did their brethren in the
private sector, skilled craftsmen in the public sector during the
1830's joined craft unions. At the state and local levels, employees
were successful in shortening the length of the workday. In 1836,
however, governmental resistance at the federal level led to a strike
at the Washington, D.C., Naval Shipyard and a mass confrontation with the President. The Executive yielded eventually, and the
federal employees won their shorter workweek. The presidential
concession marked the trend that has prevailed through subsequent years-once private sector employees have gained a benefit,
federal employees press for the same benefit.
Not until the 1880's did public associations become commonplace; further, because of their docility, these groups did not share
in the emergence during the next few decades of the labor movement as a powerful force in the American political system. The
usual pattern prevailed-the more militant private sector led the
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N & INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ASS'N, FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1975).
13 Wisconsin Employment Relations Act § 1, ch. 633, § 1, [1961] Wis. Laws,
as amended Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70-.71 (1974, Supp. 1976). In 1959, Wisconsin

recognized the right of municipal employees to engage in concerted activities and

implemented that right in 1961. See Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public
Service, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 601.
"

Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.), superseded by

Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Comp.).
See statutes cited notes 10-16 supra.
21For an historical perspective of the public employee union movement see W.
17-27 (1961); J. LoEwENBERG & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GOVERNMENT 2-11 (1972); J. STIBER, supra note 3, at 1-13; Project: Collective Bargainingand Politics in Public
HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 887, 893-96 (1972).
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way with public employees eventually reaping the harvest sown by
the private employee labor unions. Once into the twentieth century, inflationary forces preceding World War I gave momentum
to state and local government employees to affiliate with the private sector labor movement. Then came the Boston police strike
of 1919, which seemed to halt the gains of governmental unionism.27
With the strong labor movement upsurge in the 1930's came
a revived interest in public employee unions. In 1946, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) founded the first national union for
governmental employees at the state and local levels-the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME). Other public employees, such as police, firefighters,
and teachers, began to organize along more occupational lines.
Major federal legislation affecting the private sector again provided impetus for state and local government employees to stay at
the heels of private sector union members, although there was an
anti-labor tone to legislation following a rash of postwar strikes.
As the United States adjusted to a peacetime economy during
the 1950's, the ability of labor unions, in both the private and
public sectors, to effect political change began to grow. By the
beginning of the administration of President John Kennedy, the
passivity which had characterized the previous decade was replaced with an activism in many areas of society, including public
21 The Boston police strike appears to have contributed to a hardening of the
public attitude toward the aspirations of public employees, which attitude has been
a major factor in shaping public sector legislation. The strike attracted front-page,
coast-to-coast attention in newspapers, which often sensationalized the lawlessness
resulting from the strike. Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge found notoriety
by proclaiming: "There is no right to strike against the public safety of anybody,
anywhere at any time." S. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 280 (1948). "From that
time on, the dictum 'one cannot strike against the government' became a maxim
of such demonstrated political efficacy that whenever politicians, Republican or
Democrat, liberal or conservative, ran into serious trouble in their employment
relations, they would invoke it as a substitute for a personnel policy." Id. at V.
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§
141-97 (1970; Supp. V, 1975); National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act),
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970; Supp. V, 1975); Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 18687, 401-531 (1970; Supp.'V, 1975); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Wage-Hour
Law), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-16, 217-19 (1970; Supp. V, 1975); Railway Labor Act of 1926,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970); War Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943, ch. 144, §§
1-11, 57 Stat. 163 (expired by its own provisions, 1947).
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employee unionism; this spirited pace of increased unionization
and legislative change in the public sector continues.
C.

PoliticalPerspective

To discuss public sector labor-management relations properly,
one must also explore the political perspective, which gives the
relationship its form and flavor. In order to understand how collective bargaining functions in state and local governments, examination must be made of collective bargaining as a part of the political
process, 9 for the operation of these governments ultimately is an
exercise of political decision-making. More importantly, collective
bargaining in the public sector shapes political decision-making,
as will be explained shortly, and thus deserves scrutiny.
1. Differences Between Public Employers and Private Employers
Unlike their private sector counterparts, public employees
work for a different breed of employer." First, governmental decisions as to the traditional subjects of collective bargaining-wages,
hours, and working conditions-are substantially political in nature. State and local governments, when involved in political
decision-making, are engaged in a balancing of demands from various groups of persons, including public employees, for
government-provided money and services. To some degree these
decisions are influenced by the same market forces which shape
private employer decisions; for example, availability of qualified
personnel and expression of wants and desires by consumers and
taxpayers. However, neither the profit motive nor product competition in monopolistic governmental services influences public
employer decisions.
Second, in more than just an academic sense, governmental
employees work for the public constituency. This constituency is
made up of consumers and taxpayers (purchasers), often overlapping roles, whose interests are largely antithetical to the desires of
public employees for, inter alia, lighter work loads and higher
11For an excellent article with this theme see Summers, Public Employee
Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); cf. Love & Sulzner,
PoliticalImplications of Public Employee Bargaining, 11 IND. REL. 18 (1972).
11See Rhemus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector (1974) (paper presented
to the Third World Congress of the International Industrial Relations Association);
Edwards, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 10 DUQUESNE L. Rzv. 357, 358-64
(1972); Summers, supra note 29, at 1159-60.
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wages. In a practical vein, what is even more important is that the
members of the public far outnumber their public employees
(which is not to say that public employees, as members of the
public, do not exert influence upon others).
Third, unlike private employers, which centralize authority
for collective bargaining, governmental employers have several foci
of authority for collective bargaining. American governmental bodies are characterized by a division of authority (separation of powers) accompanied by checks and balances. In particular, budgetary
and personnel policy decisions are often split between executive
and legislative bodies. For example, in early 1976 in Washington,
D.C., after many months of collective bargaining regarding police
department salaries, Mayor Washington agreed to a short term
eight percent wage increase, which was promptly reduced to six
percent by the city council. And in larger cities where departmental heads engage in separate efforts at collective bargaining, further fragmentation of bargaining authority exists. Add to this a
host of elected officials with their own staffs and a plethora of
autonomous bodies acting as employers, numerous forms of government with varying degrees of blurred lines of authority, and a
lack of statutory definitiveness, and the problem grows more complex. Hence, multilateral collective bargaining, as contrasted with
bilateral collective bargaining in the private sector, is a phenomenon of labor-management relations in government.
Fourth, governmental employers generally have adopted civil
service or merit systems which, in principle, stress individual merit
as the determinative factor in personnel selection and protect employees against patronage politics and other employer abuses. In
contrast, while private employers attempt to use merit as the guiding principle in personnel selection, unions stress the role of seniority (which need not necessarily conflict with merit) and act as
exclusive representatives of the bargaining unit employees.
Fifth, in private industry the lines of authority and supervision are more clearly drawn than in governmental units. Supervisors in public employment sometimes have their hiring, discharge,
and discipline duties limited by civil service regulations or performed by personnel departments and are often included within
employee bargaining units in contrast to private sector practice.
Sixth, local governments are subject to numerous financial
constraints of which the private employer is free. State legislatures, which traditionally have been jealous of their own tax
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sources, have delimited the often meager and rigid boundaries of
local government taxation and rarely heed the cries of cities and
counties for more progressive methods of taxation. Nor is it uncommon for two or more governmental units to depend upon the same
overburdened tax base, a classic example being the West Virginia
property tax, which is limited by article 10, section 1, of the West
Virginia Constitution and is shared by cities, counties, school
boards, and other governmental units on occasion. Too often, cities
which desire to make capital improvements avoid the awkward
public vote on general obligation bonds and squeeze blocks and
mortar out of operating costs. Municipal governments must also
worry about statutorily imposed budget deadlines, fiscal years,
restrictions upon long term obligations, and fully disclosed financial records.
Seventh, the government is sovereign. Legislative bodies (absent superior legislative control), which must pay the bills for public employment, also have the power to create the public sector
collective bargaining framework.
Having pointed out the major differences between-public employers and private employers, there still is ample room for vigorous arguments, pro and con, as to the desirability of collective
bargaining in government. Much of the disagreement concerning
this issue results from an attempt to transpose the private sector
collective bargaining model to the dissimilar governmental sector.' Not only that, collective bargaining in state and local govern31A major contributing factor to this approach is the presence of private sector
labor unions in the governmental sphere. Actually, in contrast to the single form
of labor organization in the private sphere, a variety of labor organizations exist
among public employees. Most common is the mixed union, which draws its membership largely from private industry, such as the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) and the Laborers International Union of North America, both affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and the Independent International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America. Of the unions composed
almost entirely of public employees, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), affiliated with the AFL-CIO, is the largest.
Uniformed protective associations for police and firefighters include the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP), the International Conference of Police Associations (ICPA),
and the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). Additionally, there are
numerous state and local employee associations which predate public sector unions
and a host of professional associations such as the National Educational Association (NEA) [the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) considers itself a trade
union].
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ments is viewed by many persons from a negative viewpoint, partly
because management's prerogatives are restricted;"
[h]owever, if the outcome of bargaining is regarded as problematic rather than preordained, the negotiation process appears
as a variable-sum game in which a variety of joint consequences
is possible . . . .[B]oth management and the union may win
or lose as a result of decisions reached in collective negotiations.n
2. Politics: A Balancing of Competing Interests
Viewing public sector collective bargaining as problematic fits
the normal political pattern of balancing competing interests.
From a political perspective, both employer and employee needs
should be taken into account. Government needs include faithful
performance by employees, freedom to determine manpower needs
and utilization, flexibility of policy to follow majority will, and
maintenance of certain functions without interruption. Public
employee needs, on the other hand, include reasonable working
conditions, minimum security against life's vicissitudes, psychological satisfaction from participation in managerial decisions, and
preservation of political status.34 The quintessential function of
state legislatures with regard to designing the framework for public
sector labor-management relations is to be political-to balance
these competing interests of governmental bodies and their employees. In West Virginia this task has been quite difficult, as is
evidenced by the lack of statutorily mandated collective bargaining in the public sphere (which may well be caused partly by the
fear that the collective bargaining teeter-totter might tilt too far
toward union domination of governmental decision-making).3"
32It was a far easier world for public managers when decisions on

employee compensation and benefits could be made unilaterally subject
only to the approval of the legislative body. And, perhaps more important, the capacity to realize managerial objectives was far greater when
management still had managerial prerogatives, when workload, work
organization and working conditions were determined, not negotiated.
Hayes, Collective Bargainingand the Budget Director, in PUBLIC WORKzS AND
PUBLIC UNIONS 99 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
1 Lewin, Public Employment Relations: Confronting the Issues, 12 1ND. REL.
310 (1973).
Dotson, A General Theory of Public Employment, 16 PUB. AD. REv. 197
(1956).
11Whatever the merits may be as to this viewpoint, some segments of the
public employee community in West Virginia exercise significant influence as to the
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3. Distortionof the TraditionalPoliticalDecision-Making
Process
a. Budget-making
Although often unarticulated, there are a number of cogent
reasons which support the proposition that public sector collective
bargaining distorts the traditional political budgetary process
which balances the demands of competing interest groups.36 First,
collective bargaining provides public employees a special procedure, not available to other interest groups, for participating in
budget-making; the union becomes part of a two-sided budgetary
process in what is otherwise a multisided process. Second, collective bargaining requires that responsible public officials deal with
union negotiators face-to-face and bargain in good faith 37 until
either an agreement or impasse is reached. Finally, collective bargaining forecloses any change in the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, once concluded by the ultimate governmental
authority, without the consent of the union; thus, unlike an ordinance or statute, which may be repealed, a collective bargaining
agreement is final and binding.
Is this distortion of the traditional political budgetary process
justified? A good argument can be made that government employees, particularly at the local level, occupy a precarious position
which justifies their special treatment through the collective bargaining process. 8 Since payroll costs in most cities constitute 50
determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions, even absent formalized collective bargaining procedures. A case in point is the influence exerted by
local police and firefighters, who generally are considered to provide essential services. Absent an "end run" to legislative bodies, collective bargaining in West
Virginia might tend to depoliticize the existing process, which places a premium
on effective legislative lobbying.
"' See Summers, supra note 29, at 1164-65.
31Good faith bargaining is a term of art and, in the private sector, derives its
meaning from LMRA § 8(d), which reads in pertinent part:
[To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of

the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and

other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party, to agree to d
proposal or require the making of a concession ....

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
" See Summers, supra note 29, at 1165-68.
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to 75 percent of the operating budget,39 any significant general
wage increase invariably leads to a budget increase. More often
than not, such a budget increase requires reductions in other expenditures, reductions in personnel" or services, or a tax increase.
Consumers will resist cutbacks in services; taxpayers will oppose
tax increases; 4 and other interest groups will object to expenditure
reductions affecting matters of concern to them. In the spotlight
stands the public employee, whose demands attract focused resistance and few allies.2 Without collective bargaining, many public
employees may well not be able to protect their interests effectively.
b.

Multilateral collective bargaining

However persuasive may be the foregoing argument, it presents an oversimplified portrait of collective bargaining and the
political process. Quite often the public employer speaks from
many mouths and lacks a unified voice. While New York City is
more an aberration than a commonplace example, one can hardly
imagine a more blatant illustration of spiraling wage agreements,
leading to political doubletalk, with politicians blaming the power
of the unions and ignoring the weakness of a fragmented
government. 3 It would be a mistake to assume that collective bar"'

D.

STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE

120

(1972).
1OIn Detroit, salary increases for police led to temporary layoffs of 500 other
employees. Id. at 79, 126. In New York City, a 15 percent salary increase for police
led to a reduction of 6000 police personnel. R. HORTON, MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS
INNEW YORK CITY 110 (1973).
" Taxpayers oppose the most visible taxes; hence, homeowners may oppose
property taxes while renters may not, and cigarette purchasers may resist a cigarette sales tax increase while nonsmokers may not. Future taxes which might result
from benefits granted to public employees, e.g., pension benefits, are invisible and
invoke little taxpayer resistance.

12A large exception to the go-it-alone approach is the teacher community
since parents, who compose a sizable group of consumers of teacher services, may
be receptive to teacher demands. Another element of potential public employee
support is the private sector labor union movement, although private union members also are consumers and taxpayers and may resist public employee demands.
Summers, supra note 29, at 1167.

1 New York City's inability to cope with the demands of its civil servants was
one factor which led to the city's virtual bankruptcy in the fall of 1975, resulting in
the discharge of thousands of municipal employees and severe cutbacks in services.
Again, the problem in New York City is the absence of effective political
management ....
There is no longer a strong management group in
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gaining in state and local governments always is a bilateral process
between a union and unified management as in the private sector;
rather, there is strong evidence" which points to frequent instances
of multilateral collective bargaining instead of the traditional bilateral collective bargaining pattern. 5
Multilateral collective bargaining" in public sector labormanagement relations can be defined as a "process of negotiation
in which more than two distinct parties are involved in such a way
that a clear dichotomy between the employee and management
organizations does not exist."47 In other words, the bilateral assumption of the collective bargaining process may be inapplicable
New York City with whom municipal unions deal, only a potpourri of
disparate public officials who play managerial roles without either managerial power or perspective.
R. HORTON, supra note 40. Professor Horton reasons that the weak managerial role
was caused by potentially influential elected officials who abdicated their managerial responsibilities to persons not equipped to assert their new roles. Id. at 129.
In response to the fiscal crisis in New York City, Wisconsin Governor Patrick
Lucey stated that he thought public employees and their unions were becoming a
scapegoat since "commentators, editorial writers, and not a few politicians, found
it easier to blame unions than to discuss declining tax bases, political mismanagement and escalating demands on public services." 41 PUB. EMPLOYEE, Jan. 1976, at
14 (AFSCME).
" See Kochan, A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City
Governments, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 525 (1974). The article is based on a study
of 228 cities and concludes that multilateral collective bargaining in cities is common, related to a number of union and management characteristics, and a logical
outgrowth of the political process. Id. at 542.
,1Most of the literature concerning bilateral and multilateral bargaining in
the public sector neglects to establish a set of behaviors consistent with the bilateral
process. Id. at 525. Kochan remedies the situation by adopting these assumptions:
Formally designated negotiators represent both employer and employees; their purpose is to reach a tentative bargaining agreement; when their purpose is accomplished, the package is returned to the principals for ratification; all interactions
are channelled through the negotiators; and the negotiators serve as public spokesmen for the parties on bargaining issues. Admittedly, these assumptions are an
oversimplification of how bilateral collective bargaining works, but the model is
helpful. Id. at 527.
46 For the apparent origin of the expression "multilateral bargaining" see
McLennan & Moskow, Multilateral Bargaining in the Public Sector, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL WINTER MErINGS 31 (Ind.Rel. Research
Ass'n 1968). They stressed the influence of community interest groups on public
sector negotiations. For an expansion of their concept to include any additional
parties who influence public sector collective bargaining see H. JuRus & P. FEUILLE,
POLICE UNIONISM 45-49 (1973).
" Kochan, supra note 44, at 526.
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to governments largely because of the influence of third parties
upon management and the fragmentation of managerial structure;
indeed, the tendency toward multilateral bargaining in government is inherent in the municipal political process."
A few examples of multilateral collective bargaining should
suffice to illustrate the process. Where budget-making authority is
widely diffused, a common practice is for each department head
to bargain with the union representing his employees. Since the
department head is concerned primarily with the continued operation of only his department and with the outlook of only his employees, a hard line attitude by the department head would
threaten too many established interests and patterns. The result
is a fragmented bargaining approach by management with each
department head's taking care of his own domain." A case which
shows an outcome of multilateral bargaining is Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh," in which the Pennsylvania
11A number of reasons explain why multilateral bargaining is inherent in the
political process of governmental bodies, especially cities. First, the unique pricing
and monopoly characteristics of municipal government increase the interest of
many citizens and interest groups in the result of labor-management negotiations.
McLennon & Moskow, supra note 46, at 32. Second, both vertical fragmentation
(federal, state, local) and horizontal fragmentation (within each branch) of
government exist. Third, government officials and managers may intercede in the
negotiations process on behalf of employees out of ideological convictions or as a
result of interest group pressure. Fourth, the managerial negotiator responds to
directions from divided management. See H. JuRIs & P. FEUiLLE, supra note 46, at
46.
Multilateral bargaining results from a number of variable union and management characteristics in government: internal conflict among management officials,
weakness of the commitment of management decision-makers to collective bargaining, the number of internal conflict resolution procedures, use of union political
pressure tactics, political access to city officials, union involvement in city elections, and the number of visible impasse pressure tactics that a union uses in
negotiations. Kochan, supra note 44, at 528-32.
4' For another illustration of departmental dependence and the political process see J. WURF, 2 CIVIL LmERTiEs REV. No. 3 (AFSCME Reprint 1976). In 1974,
the city of Baltimore, Maryland, had negotiated the terms of a new contract with
the AFSCME public works local union, but a wildcat strike developed. Also, collective bargaining negotiations had broken down regarding the police department, and
an epidemic of "blue flu" occurred. Allegedly, Maryland Governor Mandel met
with Wurf, president of AFSCME, and agreed to no reprisals against police officers
who returned to work, ratifying a similar pledge by the mayor. However, the police
commissioner refused to abide by the no-reprisal pledge and directed the discharge
of the police officers who had walked off the job, thereby alienating union negotiators.
so PLRB Case No. PERA-C-1488-W, July 30, 1973; see 521 GERR B-5 (1973).
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Labor Relations Board sanctioned the Pittsburgh City Council's
elimination of some city employee positions over the veto of the
mayor. Obviously, this type of division of opinion among separate
branches of government does not represent a unified managerial
position; in fact, the separation of governmental powers encourages "end runs" by both management and unions from adverse
negotiations to other sources of power, especially the legislative
branch. Sometimes executive branch politicians grant a great deal
to public employee unions in contract negotiations and then use
the legislative branch as a scapegoat upon reduction of negotiated
union benefits. A final example of multilateral bargaining is provided by the city of San Francisco, where the chamber of commerce has at times become a de facto third party at the public
negotiating table, largely because of its ability to submit wage
settlements to a referendum.
Realization of the potentially adverse effects to management
of multilateral bargaining has prompted centralization and professionalization of the labor relations process with a goal of acquiring
the benefits of bilateral bargaining. 5' Centralization of bargaining
authority has given the executive branches of state and local governments more control of collective bargaining negotiations.2 Ac",Bilateral collective bargaining can be quite effective for encouraging resolu-

tion of disputes, but its effectiveness is compromised when third parties encourage
labor-management interaction through persons not at the bargaining table.
Vladeck, The "New" Public Bargaining Sector and Its Implications, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FIFtH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON

LABOR 14 (1973). Certainly, negotiators who do not have their bargaining authority

compromised are better able to influence the outcome of negotiations.
Finally, bilateral collective bargaining tends to reduce "end runs" from the

negotiating table to higher authorities. L. SHAW &T. CLARK, THE PRACTICAL DIFFERENcES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 14-16 (1972).

Oregon has attempted to reduce "end runs" by declaring as an unfair labor practice
efforts by either side to "[c]ommunicate directly or indirectly with" employees in
the bargaining unit or with public officials, as the case may be, other than the
selected bargaining representatives. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.672(1)(i), (2)(f) (1975
Replacement Part). In contrast, Florida requires that the chief executive or his
agent "consult with, and attempt to represent the views of" the legislative branch
and by formal and informal procedures to utilize the budget-making process. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 447.309 (Supp. 1976).
52 For example, some jurisdictions have established bargaining responsibilities
by statute: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4322(f)-(h) (Supp. 1975) (public employees
except teachers), defining "public agency" or "public employer," "governing
body," and "representative of the public agency" [See also KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 754327 to -4331 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except teachers), describing operation
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companying the centralization of bargaining authority has been
the delegation of bargaining responsibilities to professionals. The
risk of these two trends" is that citizens will lose influence over the
outcome of governmental collective bargaining" since legislative
influence is reduced and professional negotiators resist control of
bargaining by elected officials and politicians. 5 In sum, efforts by
public management to make the governmental bargaining structure more efficient and to minimize the effects of shadow parties
at the negotiating table arguably lead to a further distortion of
traditional political decision-making at the state and local governmental levels.
c.

Merit system

Without collective bargaining civil service commissions,
which are charged with administering merit systems, act unilaterally; after the introduction of collective bargaining, however, a
basically bilateral system of decision-making exists regarding governmental personnel administration." The traditional political
process, which allows public employers, as influenced by various
interest groups, to develop the rules of personnel administration,
is distorted to the extent that employees and their unions are given
a special position in influencing the making and administration of
of the system] (responsibilities set forth for each governmental unit); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-A(5) (1964) (state employees), defining "public employer"
(expresses responsibilities for each branch regarding state employees); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 150E, § 1 (1976), defining "employer" or "public employer" (school board
and local government chief executive are bargaining agents); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
179.74 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees) (cooperation with negotiating team by certain state officials required). Most state statutes define the term "employer." E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-2(9) (Supp. 1975)
(governor is employer).
See D. STANLEY, supra note 39, at 25-30; Burton, Local Government Bargaining and Management Structure, 11 IND. REL. 123-40 (1972).
5' The problem can be expressed in the form of the following hypothesis: the "professionalization" of collective bargaining will intensify the
forces of bureaucracy and elitism in government, and result in a further
erosion of the citizen's capacity to govern his affairs through access to the
machinery of government on a basis of equality with other citizens.
Love & Sulzner, supra note 29, at 24.
" P. BLAu & R. Sco'r, FORMAL ORGANIZATONs 59-63 (1972); T. KOcHAN, RESoLvING INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONFLICTS FOR LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 35 (PERL No. 41,
1973).
5' See Camp & Lomax, Bilateralismand the Merit Principle,28 PuB. AD. REv.
132 (1968).
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these rules. Moreover, as governments respond to collective bargaining by centralizing and professionalizing former merit systems, further distortion of the traditional political decision-making
process may evolve.
In analyzing the impact of collective bargaining upon governmental personnel administration, care must be used to distinguish
between effects upon the merit system and effects upon the merit
principle. The civil service system is the structure administering
the merit principle, which holds that public employees ought to be
selected, promoted, and retained only on account of their job qualifications (and, to some degree, job performance). In theory, it is
possible for the merit system to be replaced by collective bargaining and for the merit principle to remain.
Until recent years, public employee unions staunchly supported civil service systems; 7 since the early 1960's, however, merit
systems have come under increasing attack as being employer
dominated, 5 a response in part to the widespread growth of civil
service systems during this period of time. 9 Union criticism of
managerial dominance of civil service systems has been substantiated by the National Civil Service League, a national association
of civil service advocates and the original proponent of civil service
systems in 1881.0
51Ironically, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was founded in 1934 in Wisconsin in order to lobby against
proposed legislation which would have gutted that state's civil service system. L.
KRAMER, LABOR's PARADOX 27-38 (1962). As late as its 1960 convention, AFSCME's
official position was to encourage growth and improvement of existing civil service
systems. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE

PUBLIC SECTOR 464 (1974).

For example, Jerry Wurf, president of AFSCME, declared in a speech to the
1967 meeting of the International City Managers Association that "we should con-

sider the whole system of civil service as just another management tool ...
" 215
GERR B-5 (1967).
51In 1955, 23 states had civil service statutes which covered about 65 percent
of all full-time state employees. H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIvm SEmvICE 24-25 (1958).
By 1970, 84 percent of the cities, 83 percent of the counties, and 96 percent of the

states in a survey reported adoption of some form of merit system. National Civil
Service League, Survey of CurrentPersonnel Systems in State and Local Governments, GOOD GOVERNMENT, spring 1971, 1-28.
coThe National Civil Service League in 1971 proposed a new model public

personnel statute which would scrap civil service systems, divide their functions,
relieve the personnel function of any duty to be neutral while making the personnel

director a part of the management team, and legitimize the bilateral collective
bargaining relationship. The league's rationale for this approach was that civil
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Some state legislatures have reacted to the relationship between collective bargaining and the merit system by excluding
certain matters from collective bargaining in one of three ways:'"
(1) blanket exclusion of all matters covered by law;" (2) specific
exclusion of matters covered by merit system statutes and regulations; 3 or (3) selective exclusion of certain merit-related items."
Another legislative approach has been to declare that collective
bargaining decisions prevail over civil service rules and regulations. 5 One empirical study of local governments suggests that
merit systems have been modified by collective bargaining so that
civil service administrators have had to share or give up their
power. Whatever may be the proper legislative solution to separating collective bargaining and civil service functions, it is clear
that some legislative action is needed, for in those states where
public sector collective bargaining and the merit system coexist
and the subject matters of collective bargaining have not been
restricted as above, the two processes may collide.
Whether public sector collective bargaining will curb abuses"
service systems were not capable of protecting employee rights while developing,
policing, and managing personnel systems. 2 LMRS NEWSLErrER, Apr. 1971, at 12. The neutral function of the civil service commissions would need to be delegated
to another entity.
61Helburn & Bennett, Public Employee Bargainingand the Merit Principle,
23 LAB. L.J. 618, 623-26 (1972).
42 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:4 (Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional
university employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.702-.703 (Supp. 1976) (public
employees except firefighters and police); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1725 (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (municipal employees).
6 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540 (Deering Supp. 1976) (public school employees);
CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 3500 (Deering 1973) (local government employees); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3525 (Deering 1973) (state employees); WASH. REV. Co ANN. § 41.56.100
(Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (1974) (state employees).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 7-474 (1972,.Supp. 1976) (municipal employees);

Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, § 3 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 89-1, -9 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (1964)
(municipal employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(1) (1964) (state
employees).
" MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 7 (1976).
68 Burton, supra note 53, at 123. After studying 50 local governments, Burton
concluded that the impact of collective bargaining on civil service systems produced
one of the following: (1) Abolition of civil service commissions with a transfer of
their functions to collective bargaining, (2) strict limitations upon the authority of
these commissions, or (3) assumption of collective bargaining functions by civil
service commissions. Id.
67Begun to curb patronage politics, civil service systems have been challenged
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of the civil service system is unknown. While the debate concerning the future of civil service systems in the face of collective bargaining pressures is heated, the crystal ball remains cloudy.
Even more unclear than the impact collective bargaining may
make on the civil service system is the effect it may have on the
merit principle. Traditionally, public sector unions have devoted
their resources to improving wages, hours, and working conditions
and have expressed minimal interest in hiring and recruitment
(but have shown interest in promotions). 8 Beyond that generalization, opinion is divided among opposing views as to whether collective bargaining and the merit principle are incompatible or may
be reconciled.69 A middle view"° predicts application of a variablesum model of collective bargaining, resulting in a gradual weakening of merit as to some facets of public personnel administration
(pay and fringe benefit determinations, discipline and grievance
processing, more use of seniority" and closed exams in promotions,
and shorter probational periods) and a strengthening of the merit
principle as to other personnel policies (rejection of rule-of-three
for rule-of-one, limited use of provisional employees, greater due
process in grievance procedures, and supportive stands for existing

civil service functions) .12
as lacking merit, prohibiting good management, frustrating able employees, inhibiting productivity, being unresponsive to the citizenry's needs, and undermining
taxpayers' confidence. Savas & Ginsburg, The Civil Service: A Meritless System,
32 PUB. INTEREST 72 (1973).
s' D. STANLEY, supra note 39, at 136-52.
For a helpful analysis of these opposing viewpoints see Lewin & Horton, The
Impact of Collective Bargainingon the Merit System in Government, 30 ARs. J.
199 (1975). Alleged threats to the merit principle include the union shop, seniority,
union administration of grievance procedures (affecting an individual's right of
petition), negotiated wage packages (replacing integrated position classification
and pay plans), and fringe benefits common to all employees. J. TELCHOOK & H.
TAHNE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND THE MERIT SYSTEM 43
(1972); Morse, Shall We Bargain Away the Merit System?, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 154 (K. Warner ed. 1965).
,0 Lewin & Horton, supra note 69.
" The relationship between seniority and merit (ability) is unclear, although
many persons assume that the two principles are often incompatible. Actually, the
gripe of employers about seniority is more directly related to a lessening of managerial prerogatives by contractually mandated use of seniority than to an attack on
the seniority-merit relationship. There is some evidence which suggests that seniority and merit usually are harmonious principles. Healy, The Factorof Ability in

Labor Relations, in

ARBITRATION TODAY

45 (J. McKelvey ed. 1955).

7, Helsby & Jayner, Impact of the Taylor Law on Local Government, in R.
CONNERY & W. FARR, UNIONIZATION OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 24-41 (1970).
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Union pressure tactics

Unions resort to a variety of pressure tactics to influence the
outcome of public sector collective bargaining-strikes, publicity
in the form of news conferences and various advertisements, picketing, threats to strike, mass meetings, slowdowns, sick-outs, manipulation of the grievance procedure, lobbying, participation in
elections, limited adherence to rules and production procedures,
and shifting stances at the bargaining table. While some of these
pressure tactics are available to other community interest groups,
unions are uniquely positioned to assert pressure tactics in support
of their demands made during face-to-face collective bargaining.
No doubt public attention drawn to union pressure tactics and to
underlying issues of broad public concern heightens the citizenry's
apprehension about union pressure tactics. Where public sector
collective bargaining exists, the political decision-making process
is distorted to the extent that all public employee unions are empowered to exert these pressure tactics and to the extent that these
unions exercise more influence over political decision-making than
before collective bargaining.73
Many of the pressure tactics just enumerated have been used
by public employee unions for years, even prior to the existence of
collective bargaining statutes for state and local governments. And
while legislative bodies have by-and-large prevented public employees from engaging in the election process, this same restriction
usually has not applied to public employee unions. Even so, collec13The power of public employee unions to influence political decision-making

is unevenly distributed regardless of whether collective bargaining is allowed. Those
unions which are experienced in public sector politics and craft unions which have
private sector ties are better able to deliver the vote than less experienced unions
or strictly public unions and, thereby, are more likely to receive favorable treatment
from allied government officials. Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of
Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 431 (1970). Likewise, those public
sector unions whose members' services are considered essential by the citizenry,
such as the police and firefighters, are in a superior position to influence political
decision-making on their behalf.
The issue at hand, therefore, given the inequalities described, is whether the
ability of public employee unions, individually or collectively, to influence political
decision-making is enhanced by pressure tactics exerted on behalf of their collective
bargaining demands. If so, distortion of the political decision-making process has
occurred. For a view that there are various deficiencies in theories asserting that
public employee strikes inevitably distort the decision-making process in the public
sector see Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public
Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970).
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tive bargaining has provided a channel for funneling employee
demands to public management and a clearer target for pressure
tactics. Unfortunately, exclusive of the strike, research about the
use of union pressure tactics in support of bargaining table demands has been miniscule; therefore, attention will now be devoted to the strike, realizing that only a partial picture of union
pressure tactics and political decision-making will be presented.
Granting public employees the right to strike is too bitter a
political pill for most state legislators to swallow; accordingly, only
six states have adopted legislation granting some public employees
a limited right to strike. 7 In these six states, as well as in those
states where public employee strikes are forbidden, the number of
strikes has increased dramatically since the early 1960's. 75 The
1 Alaska's statute divides public employees, for strike purposes, into three
categories according to essentiality of services, with employees who perform the
most essential services being forbidden to strike and employees who provide less
essential services being allowed to strike for a limited period of time after mediation
or to strike for extended periods of time. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972). Hawaii
allows public employee strikes after exhaustion of statutory procedures and a
cooling-off period; however, where public health or safety is endangered, the employer may petition the state public employment relations board for relief. HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 89-12(b), (c) (Supp. 1975). Pennsylvania prohibits strikes of certain
categories of employees supplying essential services and allows other employees to
strike until there is a clear and present danger or threat to the public health, safety,
or welfare, justifying judicial relief. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001, .1003
(Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters and police). Montana's statute
grants public employees the right to engage in specific as well as "other concerted
activities," which expression has been interpreted to authorize public employee
strikes. State v. Public Employees' Craft Council, 529 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974),
interpreting MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-1603(1) (Supp. 1975) (public employees
except nurses and professional engineers). Oregon prohibits strikes or recognition
of union picket lines by specified groups of employees providing essential services,
while other employees may strike under limited conditions (presence of appropriate
unit, no binding arbitration, exhaustion of mediation and factfinding, 30-day
cooling-off period, 10-day notice of strike, and no clear and present danger or threat
to public health, safety, or welfare as determined by a trial court). ORE. REv. STAT.
§§ 243.726, .732, .736 (1975 Replacement Part). Lastly, Vermont denies to state
employees the right to strike but allows municipal employees a limited right to
strike if public health, safety, or welfare is not endangered; also, teachers' strikes
may not be enjoined unless there is a clear and present danger to a sound educational program. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903(b) (1972 Replacement Edition) (state
employees, state college employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (1972) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (municipal employees).
11The statistics in the following chart relate to work stoppages which involved
at least six workers and lasted a full day or full shift or longer:
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large jump in government strikes began in 1966, as did the current
inflationary trend, and most of these work stoppages have arisen
from disputes over wages and union recognition in contrast to the
prior employee emphasis on job security." Even in the face of an
aura of illegality, there is evidence to demonstrate that strike sanctions are often ineffective.7 7 In light of this information, the logical
U.S.

BUREAU

OF LABOR STATISTICS,

DEP'T OF LABOR,

WORK STOPPAGES IN

1973 (1975). It is important to note that in 1973 less than 1.5 percent
of all government employees were on strike, as compared to 2.9 percent in the total
economy, and that the duration of strikes was longer than in previous years, averaging 12.6 days for economic issues, 12.8 days for contractual issues, and 11.6 days
for recognition and security issues.
Regarding teacher strikes, in the 1973-1974 school year, there were 154 teacher
strikes, affecting 74,000 teachers in 20 states and involving an estimated 718,000
person-days of instruction. GERR, RF-101, 71:1051 (1975). Regarding municipal
employee strikes during the years 1970-1974, the major issues underlying these
strikes were in order of frequency as follows: Wages, union organization and security, wage adjustments, plant administration, and supplementary benefits.
Torrence, City Public Employee Work Stoppages:A Time-Line Analysis for Educational Purposes, 27 LAB. L.J. 177, 179 (1976).
One study concluded that metropolitan area strikes (public and private) during 1968-1970 occurred at a low frequency rate in areas characterized by relatively
low levels of industrialization and unionization, greater income inequality, and
below-average quality of life, as compared to high frequency strike rate in metropolitan areas which were more populous, more unionized, more industrialized, and
more well-to-do. Stern, IntermetropolitanPatterns of Strike Frequency, 29 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 218 (1976).
In the October 1975 edition of the official newspaper of the American Federation of Teachers, there was a headline which proclaimed, "100,000 AFT members
strike across U.S.," referring to teacher strikes during September 1975 in at least
five states. American Teacher, Oct. 1975, at 3, cols. 1-4.
78 White, Work Stoppages of Government Employees, in J. LOEWENBERG & M.
MOSKOW, supra note 26, at 252.
11A study of public strikes during a three-year period in California revealed
that the judicial injunctive process neither prevented nor halted illegal strikes, was
invoked sporadically, and was applied unequally to strikers. Cebulski, An Analysis
of 22 Illegal Strikes and California Law, 18 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. 2-17 (1973).
The availability of judicial relief will depend upon the statutes and court
interpretations in the jurisdiction at hand. In Rhode Island, for example, the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" applies to a public employer's request for injunctive
relief. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973).
Similarly, in Michigan, injunctive relief will be granted to the public employer only
where irreparable damage will be caused by the strike and the employer has "clean
hands." School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
Besides injunctive relief, other court sanctions against individuals include fines,
imprisonment, loss of job, loss of tenure, and loss of the gains achieved as a result
of the strike. Striking organizations may lose their rights to represent employees
or their rights to checkoff or may be fined, and their officers may be fined or imGOVERNMENT,
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inquiry is whether public strikes have been effective in achieving
their goals. Unfortunately, there has been little research done to
discover that answer, so no empirically derived conclusion is presented here, only factual tidbits. 8
Despite the lack of empirical analysis regarding the effectiveness of strikes, there is lively debate over the "right" of public
employees to strike. Reasons advanced for denying the right to
strike in the public sector include the following: (1) Market restraints are weak in the public sector, largely because the services
are essential; (2) the public places pressure on public officials to
arrive at a quick settlement; (3) other public pressure groups have
prisoned for contempt. See Howlett, History and Nature of Collective Bargaining
in the United States: A Review of the Rationale and the Considerationof Its Application to the Public Sector, in AMERICAN ARaITRATION ASS'N & INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ASS'N, supra note 22, at 31. Once an injunction has issued,
courts may enforce their orders by the contempt power, and at least one court has
held that taxpayers have the right to insist that anti-strike penalties be enforced.
Cincinnati v. District 51, 35 Ohio St. 2d 197, 299 N.E.2d 686 (1973). However, states
which have statutory strike penalties have used these sanctions sparingly. P.
STAUDOHAR, PUBLic EMPLOYMENT DIsPUTES AND DisPUTE SETTLEMENT 16 (1972).
11For instance, two seemingly contrasting results from separate strikes in
Pennsylvania are of interest. In July 1975, almost 50,000 state employees struck,
the largest strike (in number of persons) of state or local government employees in
United States history.
The union demanded a 30 percent pay increase, later scaling its demand
down to 10 percent. But Gov. Milton Shapp (D) said it was a year to hold
the line and stuck with the state's offer of 3.5 percent. Weakened by court
orders sending many essential employees back to work, the union quickly
settled for what amounted to only 1.25 percent more than the state's
offer.
Pierce, Showdown Year with the Public Employee Unions, 1 STATE LEGISLATURES
10 (No. 2, 1975).
The other strike, involving 4000 Pittsburgh teachers, started December 1, 1975,
and ended around January 26, 1976. Schools charged with educating the city's
62,000 students closed, leading to the school board's decision to end the strike to
avoid losing a $211,000 daily state subsidy. The resultant 30-month contract contained a three-step pay raise totalling 27.4 percent, guaranteed class size plus or
minus six students, increased life insurance payments, layoff benefits but without
the former guarantee of no layoffs, teacher scheduling provisions, reading program
provisions, and promise of disciplinary reform. On account of the wage settlement,
School Superintendent Olson has predicted future layoffs unless a tax increase is
effected. During the strike the union (AFT Local 400) was fined $105,000 for violation of an injunctive order, and individual teacher fines were also assessed but not
collected because the judicial hearings would have been too time consuming. 642
GERR B-15 to -17 (1976).
See K. OCHELTREE, SIX STRIKE STORIES (PERL No. 20, 1969).
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no weapons comparable to the strike; and (4) strikes impose a high
cost since the political process is distorted. 9 In reply, the following
arguments are asserted: (1) Market restraints exist in the forms of
public employee wage losses during strikes, multilateral bargaining (including taxpayer resistance), fixed public utility rates,
availability of subcontracting government services, and the varying degrees of essentiality of services; (2) pressure upon public
managers to settle strikes depends upon the essentiality of the
service cut off; (3) management lockouts can be authorized to
combat strike tactics; and (4) the strike is just another, albeit
necessary, political weapon and, as such, is not alien to the legislative process." In rebuttal, it is argued that many governmental
services should not be cut off since their essentiality depends, not
necessarily upon the immediate danger to public health and
safety, as when police and firefighter services are terminated, but
upon the inelastic demand' which exists for most government
services (the inelasticity's being due to steady product demand,
insensitivity to price changes, and lack of close substitutes) and
since the public has a high intolerance for inconvenience."
As the academic debate continues about how well public employers may resist strikes," public employee strikes continue to
occur even though often they are illegal. The risk inherent in these
strikes or strike threats is that public employee unions will obtain
a disproportionate amount of political power to affect political
11Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
" Burton & Krider, supra note 73, at 425-32.
X1One investigator has verified low wage elasticities for several categories of
state and local government employment. Ehrenberg, The Demand for State and
Local Government Employees, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 366 (1973).
92 Wellington & Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J.
441 (1970).
" Burton and Krider conclude that, with the exception of police and firefighter
strikes, public officials are, "to some degree, able to accept long strikes." Burton
& Krider, supra note 73, at 427. Cited as examples of prolonged government resistance are a 48-day strike by Kalamazoo, Michigan, sanitation men and laborers, an
87-day strike by welfare workers in Sacramento County, California, and a 3-month
strike of hospital workers in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Id. Additionally, analysis of
1965-1968 strike data prompted Burton and Krider to conclude that local governments were able to continue partial operation during 92 percent of the essential
strikes, in 80 percent of the intermediate-essential strikes, and in 77 percent of the
nonessential strikes. Id. at 435. Another commentator believes that the public can
marginally reduce its reliance on police in a strike situation but is quite vulnerable
to a firefighter strike. R. HORTON, supra note 40, at 142-43.
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decision-making; the risk in disallowing such strikes is facing the
unpalatable choice of punishing a multitude of striking public
workers or incurring disrespect for the law by ignoring the strike
ban. While some argue that public employee unions have too little
relative power without the right to strike,84 other persons disagree."
Whatever the proper assessment may be of granting a limited right
to strike to public employees, the use of the strike and other previously dormant pressure tactics distorts the traditional political
decision-making process.
4. Impact of Collective Bargaining
Since most states have adopted some form of public sector
collective bargaining, it behooves West Virginians to study the
effects of the collective bargaining in those state and local governments. Present day research is sufficiently sophisticated to make
credible judgments concerning the impact of collective bargaining
upon wages but offers only premature judgments as to the general
effects of collective bargaining upon other aspects of the employeremployee relationship, such as hiring, promotion, training, grievances, discipline, classification, fringe benefits, subcontracting,
workload and manning, work assignments, other working conditions, and management's ability to manage.
Private sector experience teaches that the impact of labor unions upon their employers is to some degree proportional to the
unions' cohesiveness. Similarly, in the public sector, once the
collective bargaining relationship has been established, union cohesiveness is aided by the union's exclusive representative status,
dues checkoff provisions, agency shop, union shop or other related
grants of dominion, and large bargaining units. Another important
determinant of the impact of public sector collective bargaining is
the permissible scope of negotiations since significant matters of
union concern may be excluded by statute from negotiations and,
thereby, be protected from the impact of collective bargaining.
The topics alluded to above will be more fully discussed in part two
of this paper. Finally, there is persuasive evidence to indicate that
the impact of collective bargaining in the public sector is directed
1 E.g., Burton & Krider, supra note 73, at 432; Kheel, Strikes and Public
Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931 (1969).
1 E.g., Shaw & Clark, Public Sector Strikes: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 2 J. LAW
& ED. 217 (1973); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargainingin Public
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 823-24 (1970).
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more by management organizational characteristics and other factors than by union pressure tactics."'
Presenting data which shows the impact of collective bargaining on the wage rate, by itself, can be misleading since a common
practice is to make trade-offs between wage increases and increased fringe benefits, to name just one example. Moreover, literature in this area tends to ignore growth rates of wages, rather
focusing upon increases in preexisting salary levels and discounting the effect of government wage increases upon nearby private
sector personnel. In sum, the impact of collective bargaining on
public employee wages is probably underestimated.
With these limitations in mind, a review of the research performed to date reveals that collective bargaining has increased
state and local government employee wage levels up to five percent
above the levels which would have prevailed in the absence of
collective bargaining.81 This small, and probably underestimated,
" The evidence comes from a survey of 121 cities. See Kochan & Wheeler,
Municipal Collective Bargaining:A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes,
29 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 46 (1975). In order of descending impact upon a union's
collective bargaining goals are these elements: The existence of either factfinding

or compulsory arbitration provisions, the degree of decision-making power of the
management negotiator, the incompatibility between the mayor and city council,
and the involvement of elected officials in the collective bargaining process once
an impasse has occurred. Although not strongly related to their impacts upon
collective bargaining, the union characteristics which correlate most positively with
favorable union bargaining goals are union militancy and union endorsement of
candidates in local elections, especially mayoral aspirants; nevertheless, union
pressure tactics can cause internal management conflict and multilateral bargaining. Id.
11D. STANLEY, supra note 39, at 74-79; Ashenfelter, The Effect of Unionization
on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case of Firefighters,24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
191 (1971); Baird & Landon, The Effects of Collective Bargainingon PublicSchool
Teachers' Salaries, 25 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 410 (1973); Ehrenberg, Municipal
Government Structures,Unionizationand the Wages of Firefighters,27 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 36 (1973); Fogel & Lewin, Wage Determinationin the Public Sector, 27
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 410 (1974); Freund, Market and Union Influences on Municipal Employee Wages, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 391 (1974); Hall & Carroll, The
Effects of Teachers' Organizationson Salariesand Class Size, 26 IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 834 (1973); Kasper, The Effects of Collective Bargainingon Public School
Teachers' Salaries, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 57 (1970); Lewin, supra note 33; Lipsky

& Drotning, The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers' Salariesin New
York State, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 18 (1973); Perloff, Comparing Municipal
Salaries With Industry and FederalPay, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46 (1971); Schmenner, The Determinationof MunicipalEmployee Wages, 55 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
83 (1973); Thornton, The Effects of Collective Negotiations on Teachers' Salaries,
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impact of state and local government collective bargaining occurs
in a context of greater wage growth than in private industryu and
better pay for comparable jobs than in the private sector, except
as to high-level managers and professionals,"9 producing a more
egalitarian occupational wage structure."
Measurements of other effects of collective bargaining have
been much more imprecise than with wage impact. Generally, it
may be said that the impact of collective bargaining upon state
and local governments varies with the goals of the negotiators, the
economic conditions of the day, and the maturity and nature of the
collective bargaining relationship. Preliminary conclusions about
the collective bargaining impact suggest the following: Public
employee unions have expressed minimal interest and, therefore,
have produced little effect on hiring and training policies but have
made a modest impact on promotion policies; public sector unions,
because of intense interest, have succeeded in formalizing the
grievance process, which often leads to arbitration, and have
caused public managers to be more cautious in meting out sanctions within a more formalized disciplinary process; more aggressive public employee union leaders have pushed for pay classification revision through collective bargaining or grievance procedures
with indecisive results so far; while fringe benefits, overtime pay,
and special pay arrangements have been liberalized for state and
local government employees, the primary cause is unclear; parity
between the salaries of police and firefighters has been widely accepted and aided by collective bargaining; firefighters have been
successful in collective bargaining efforts at reducing working
hours; public employee unions' resistance to the contracting-out of
work currently being done by government employees has met with
11 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 41 (1971); Thornton, Monopsony and Teachers' Salaries:
Some Contrary Evidence, 28 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 574 (1975).
1 Between 1960 and 1970, depending upon the public job performed, wage
rates increased 56.7-76.6 percent in state and local governments, contrasted with a
44.8-50.5 percent wage increase for private sector employees. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1974, at 301 (1974). A
similar conclusion has been drawn for federal government workers in that, in both
1960 and 1970, federal employees were paid more than comparable private sector
workers both in absolute earnings differential and in the wage rate differential.
Smith, Pay DifferentialsBetween FederalGovernment and PrivateSector Workers,
29 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 186 (1976).
" Fogel & Lewin, supra note 87, at 428.
" Id.; Lewin, supra note 33, at 316; Perloff, supra note 87.
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good success; in contrast, efforts by public employee unions to
influence workload, manning, and program policy have produced
negligible results although these unions have been effective in creating subtle changes in working conditions; lastly, from a broader
perspective, public management, in confronting collective bargaining, has retained the right to manage-to determine policy
and to plan operations-while consulting with union representatives.'
When observing the results of the collective bargaining interrelationship, one must remember that scholarly investigations of
the bargaining process involve generalizations not necessarily
applicable to a particular locale, region, or state. Statistical reviews of collective bargaining impacts provide perspective but depersonalize the human aspect of collective bargaining. "It's easy
now to forget that Martin Luther King, Jr. lost his life in Memphis,
just 6 years ago, demonstrating for garbage collectors who earned
just $1.10 an hour, and had no sick pay, vacations, or grievance
'9 2
procedures, and whose union the city wouldn't even talk to.
Impressive gains in public employee wages since 1960 may well
reflect the personalization of decision-making concerning wages.
Generalizations about the impact of collective bargaining
upon the public sector need more study and are by no means
unanimous. 3 The task of legislators is to unravel the maze of data
D. STANLEY, supra note 39, at 46-148.
One study of the impact of collective bargaining for teachers in school systems
concluded that the freedom of local school boards to set basic policy has remained
intact through collective bargaining, although administrative discretion in areas
calling for significant exercise of professional judgment has been moderately altered. C. PERRY & W. WILDMAN, THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
165-71 (1970). See generally J. VLADECK & S. VLADECK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAW (1975); D. WOLL'r & R. CHANIN, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS (1974). In primary and secondary
"1

education, the three educational policy issues which are most commonly discussed

at the bargaining table are class size, student discipline, and curriculum reform.
2 Pierce, supra note 78, at 11.
Jerry Wurf, president of AFSCME, believes the following:
[Sitate-local earnings showed a substantial increase during the period
[1955-1973] precisely because wages in that sector have been shamefully
low until recently ....
[Miost ...
workers still lag behind their counterparts in private industry ....
Actual dollar increases, as opposed to

percentage increases, have been greater for several major industries,
among them transportation, electrical utilities, mining, communications,
and contract construction.
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available and seek specific ways of structuring a collective bargaining relationship which takes into account the impact of collective
bargaining as well as the needs of government workers.
5.

A PoliticalSolution

The normal American political process is "one in which there
is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the
population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage
in the process of decision."'" Much attention has been devoted here
to describing how collective bargaining in state and local governments can distort the traditional decision-making process; however, this distortion does not mean a fortiori that what is defined
as the normal American political process is to be warped. Instead,
public sector collective bargaining, if conducted by responsible
parties within a structure which reasonably balances competing
interests, can alter the traditional political decision-making processes of state and local governments to conform with the normative conception of the American political process. In so doing, public sector collective bargaining can advance the goals usually attributed to that procedure in the private sector; namely, industrial
peace, industrial democracy, political representation, and a
needed substitute for individual bargaining." In other words,
collective bargaining can assure the public worker an effective
voice in the formation of decisions governing his daily life.
The issue for concern is whether collective bargaining at the
state and local government levels distorts the normal American
political process so that public employees have a disproportionate
amount of political power (beyond having an effective voice in the
making of decisions which affect their lives). Stated axiomatically,
state and local governments should remain sovereign in their rights
through law to ensure survival of the normal American political
process."
Wurf, Jerry Wurf Replies, 1 STATE LEGISLATURES 12 (No. 2, 1975). He further states
that most public employees but only a minority of private employees must pay for
their health benefits; state unemployment benefits are usually not available for
public employees; and, while private employee pension plans are non-contributory
and are protected by the 1974 Pension Reform Act, public employee pension plans
have little legal protection and are contributory. Id.
g R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956).
's Wellington & Winter, supra note 79, at 1112.
Id. at 1125-26.
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Whether the normal American political process can accommodate public employee strikes is a matter of some debate. One proposition which both sides of the debate are obliged to recognize is
that, for the forseeable future, public employee strikes or threats
thereof will remain a reality97 in spite of public opposition, particularly as to strikes by police and firefighters.
Solutions to the strike phenomenon run the gamut from a
strictly enforced no-strike policy to the legalization of nonessential
services strikes.9 Between these two extremes lies an approach
which strengthens the ability of the collective bargaining process
to resolve differences effectively and the use of post-impasse procedures designed to encourage or impose a solution to the conflicting positions of the parties. The second part of this article will
describe and evaluate mechanisms for resolving public employment disputes.
11Besides the statistical evidence previously presented, the attitudes of public
sector labor unions assure use or threat of use of the strike power. To illustrate this
attitude, one need only look at article II, section 1 of the constitution of the AFT,
which lists the following as an object of AFT: "To obtain exclusive bargaining rights
for teachers and other educational workers, with the right to strike." Indeed, Albert
Shankar, president of AFT, feels that, next to the right to vote and the right to
speak out, "the right to strike is perhaps the most important .... " AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, SPEAKING FREELY (Transcript Series No. 2, 1974). Shankar
believes that the ability of teachers to strike is necessary to prod the public employer to adopt a flexible bargaining position and that the very illegality of the
strike attracts welcome attention and needed public support. 0. FORD, SHOULD WE
JAIL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 35, 49 (Workers Defense League 1973).
The official AFSCME position favors the right to strike in public employment.
International Executive Board, AFSCME, Policy Statement on Public Employee
Unions: Rights and Responsibilities 2 (1966). President Wurf embraces the view
that the right to strike is fundamental to a nontotalitarian society, albeit the strike
weapon is painful to workers and is needed only infrequently. Wurf, supra note 49,
at 11-12. As for police and firefighters, Wurf, absent binding arbitration or a strike
alternative, reluctantly advocates their right to strike. Public Workers Under
Fire-What Their Union Chief Says, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1975, at
50.
The AFL-CIO appears to have adopted a position endorsing an unqualified
right of public employees to strike where circumstances warrant a strike. 627 GERR
B-3 (1975).
11Widespread opposition of the American citizenry to strikes by police and
firefighters was expressed in a 1975 Gallup poll. 626 GERR B-22 (1975).
11If one accepts the idea that the public employer-employee relationship needs
collective bargaining, recognition strikes during the life of the collective bargaining
agreement should be uncommon under a well-drafted collective bargaining statute.
Strikes in support of bargaining demands, however, will not readily disappear with
the wave of a legislative wand.
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Politics permeates the process of balancing public employeremployee interests the way the pungent aroma of a West Virginia
ramp feast invades a house-all areas are affected. When mayors,
city managers, chambers of commerce, public employee associations and unions, and others descend upon a state capitol, legislators feel pressure to enact a solution which balances these competing interests, for the nature of politics is to find compromise solutions. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to conclude
that West Virginia eventually will accede to the force majeure and
legislate some form of collective bargaining statute. Even with
enactment of collective bargaining legislation, politics will continue to dominate the public employer-employee relationship"'0
since collective bargaining is inescapably a creature of the political
environment. What should be the nature of this political solution?
Part two of this paper suggests various alternatives for legislators
to consider.
PART TWO
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer
to it?" said the March Hare.
"Exactly so," said Alice.
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare
went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean
what I say-that's the same thing, you know."
-Lewis

Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland

Like the fictional voyager through Lewis Carroll's Wonderland, state legislators, when confronted with the task of providing solutions for resolution of public employment disputes, sometimes feel as if they are trapped in a maze. About them is their
own Cheshire cat, inexperience, pointing various paths for them
to take, and whispering jabberwocky in their ears are the various
interest groups ready to issue royal verdicts for whichever course
of action is pursued. "Would you tell me, please, which way

'- See generally LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SERVICE, THE ROLE OF POLITICS
INLOCAL LABOR RELATIONS (LMRS Monograph 1973); Belasco, Municipal Bargaining and Political Power, in J. LOEWENBERG & M. MOSKOW, supra note 26.
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I ought to go from here?" asked Alice. "That depends a good deal
on where you want to get to," replied the Cheshire cat. 0'
Three types of disputes leading to impasse arise in the public
sector employer-employee relationship: (1) representational, (2)
grievance ("rights"), and (3) collective bargaining ("interests").
Representational disputes evolve from efforts by public employee
unions to obtain employer recognition or bargaining rights. Grievance disputes result from differences in interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining
disputes occur when management and a union are unable to reach
agreement as to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The substance of each area of dispute will be presented, and
then the various methods of dispute resolution will be analyzed.
II.

THE SUBSTANCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DISPUTES

A. RepresentationalDisputes
Disputes surrounding the representative status of public employee unions are a product of the forms of recognition accorded
these unions, the manner of their selection as employee representatives, and the composition and appropriateness of the bargaining
units involved. Even more basic to the gestation of representational disputes is the exclusion of, or coverage given to, public
employees by the various state statutes,' because the public employer's bargaining obligation is statutorily derived.
In the private sector, the bargaining obligation flows from
"employer"'0 3 to "labor organizations"''04 "designated or selected
L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND.
For instance, due to the influence of police and firefighter groups, several
states have special collective bargaining legislation for those personnel. E.g., GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-1301 to -1315 (1974) (firefighters in cities above 20,000); IDAHO
CODE §§ 44-1801 to -1811 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.470.480 (Supp. 1976) (county police); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.010-.130 (Supp. 1976)
(firefighters); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(31)-(47) (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
105-B:1-:14 (Supp. 1973) (local government police); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1.10 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1 to -15.(1968, Supp. 1975) (firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.2-1 to -15 (1968, Supp. 1975) (police); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 9-14A-1 to -22 (Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5154c-1, §§ 1-20 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (1974, Supp. 1976);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to -273 (1967 Replacement Volume) (firefighters).
10 "[Ejmployer" is defined as including
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
'°'

102
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for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees' 5 in a unit appropriate' 56 for such purposes,"' 7 which
organizations "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."'' " The provision is set forth here because
it has served as a model for most collective bargaining legislation.
Many representational disputes arise when there is a conflict in
interpretation of one of these key terms creating the bargaining
obligation. Resolution of such definitional disputes generally is
accomplished by petitioning for relief from the board charged with
administering the state collective bargaining statute, but arbitration is sometimes used to provide a solution."'°
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent
of such labor organization.
LMRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
, "[Labor organization" is defined as
any organization of any kind of any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate, and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work.
LMRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
IO "[Elmployee" is defined as including
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
LMRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
"0, The LMRA requires the NLRB to decide whether, "in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising their rights," the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining shall be "the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. . . ." LMRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
"0 LMRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
IDA
Id.
"I See Rhemus, Arbitrationof Representationand BargainingUnit Questions

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss1/4

38

Kincaid: Resolving Public Employment Disputes: A Guide for West Virginia
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTES
Since the appropriate unit question is the predominant issue
in literature analyzing representational disputes, only cursory attention will be devoted here to discussing types of recognition and
methods of selecting the employee representative.
1.

Types of Recognition and Methods of Selection

Most state public sector collective bargaining statutes have
emulated the private sector statutory principle of exclusive representation. Establishment of exclusive representative status for a
union is important, for the attractiveness of union membership is
enhanced and the union is assured of avoiding bitter fights with
competing labor organizations for the right to represent all the unit
employees."' A notable exception to the general rule is the California statute, which originally provided for representation of employees on a "members-only" basis, but which now equivocally
provides for exclusive representation of local government employees and proportional representation for teachers."' Proportional
representation exists when unions are allowed representation on a
negotiating council in proportion to their memberships within the
bargaining unit. Minnesota teachers were once proportionally represented in negotiations, but this statutory device was repealed in
1972.111
The most common public sector method of selecting the representative of a majority of bargaining unit employees is the secret
ballot election. In some states, however, a union's representative
status may be determined by the agency administering the state
statute on the basis of authorization cards"' or by other suitable
methods."' When the election method is used, representative stain Public Employment Disputes, in
256-60 (BNA 1967).
j. STIEBER,
J'

THE ARBITRATOR, THE

NLRB

AND THE COURTS

supra note 3, at 127.

m See Grodin, Public Employee Bargainingin California:The Meyers-MiliasBrown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1972).
I

Minn. Law of 1967, ch. 633, § 1-8 (repealed 1972), superseded by

STAT. ANN.

MINN.

§§ 179.61-.76 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital

employees).
3 E.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1973).

114Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, and Vermont also allow for recognition
without an election. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-468, -471 (1972) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b (Supp. 1976) (teachers); Conn. Pub. A.
No. 75-566, § 5 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
447.307 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.67 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
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tus is determined by a majority of the votes cast. The state public
employment relations boards often must determine whether a sufficient showing of interest has been made to hold an election and
whether election, certification, recognition, and contract bars to
the election exist.
2. Appropriate Unit Determination
Since a labor union is entitled by law to represent only those
public employees who are in an appropriate bargaining unit, the
determination of appropriateness is an important function of public employment relations boards." ' Public management considers
appropriate only those bargaining units which maximize management's view of efficient and effective labor relations policies, while
public employee unions are somewhat more pragmatic and emphasize those bargaining units which guarantee their selections as
exclusive collective bargaining representatives. Undoubtedly, policy considerations, as well as practicalities, guide public employment relations boards in exercising their quasi-judicial determinations of what are appropriate bargaining units.
The most common criteria included in state collective bargaining statutes for determining an (not "the")"' appropriate barexcept charitable hospital employees); VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 3, § 941 (1972

Replacement Edition, Cum. Supp. 1976) (state employees, state college employees).
"' Public employment relations boards are charged with the duty to make
appropriate unit determinations in almost all the jurisdictions which have collective bargaining statutes. See D. OwAOA & J. NAJITA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS
IN PUBLIC CoLLErvE BARGAINING: UNIT DETERMINATION 1 (1973). Again, California

provides the exception to the rule in that there the public employer is authorized
to make the judgment as to the appropriateness of bargaining units, subject to
judicial review. See Grodin, CaliforniaPublicEmployee BargainingRevisited: The
MMB Act in the Appellate Courts, 21 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. 2 (1974). Nevada

allows the public employer to make the appropriate unit determination, subject to
appeal to the PERB, which must apply "the same criterion." NEV. REV. STAT. §
288.170(2) (1975) (local government employees).
"I In the private sector, the LMRA has not been interpreted as mandating the
only or the ultimate or the most appropriate bargaining unit; rather, the LMRA
requires only that the unit be "appropriate"; that is, appropriate to ensure to
employees in each case "the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
this subchapter [of the LMRA]." LMRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 417-19 (1950), enforced, 190 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1951). Accordingly, there is more than one way in which employees of a given
employer may appropriately be grouped for purposes of collective bargaining. E.g.,
General Instrument Corp. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 420, 422-23 (4th Cir. 1963). The
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gaining unit are the following: (1) Whether the employees concerned have a clear and identifiable community of interest; (2)
whether the proposed unit will result in effective dealings and
efficiency of operations; and (3) whether the employees have a
history of representation, which usually may not be a controlling
factor."7 An emphasis on any one factor can be decisive in establishing the size and scope of a bargaining unit. Some state statutes
are structured virtually to prevent small collective bargaining
units;"' yet, a proliferation of units is sometimes allowed where
professionals seek to organize.
Unions tend to favor smaller bargaining units, while governmental employers advocate larger units. Illustrative of these divergent viewpoints are Philadelphia, which contains one principal
bargaining unit, and New York City, which has had over 200
collective bargaining units at one time.' The arguments for large
discretion granted by statute to the NLRB to determine an appropriate bargaining
unit is broad.
Against the flow of both the private sector and the public sector experiences
are the Maine and Oregon statutes, which dictate that "the" appropriate unit be
selected. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 966 (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees);
ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-E (Supp. 1976) (state employees); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 243.682 (1975 Replacement Part). To the same effect is the approach taken
by the New York PERB. Crowley, The Resolution of Representation Status Disputes Under the Taylor Law, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 517, 518-20 (1969).
"I Shaw & Clark, Determinationof Appropriate BargainingUnits in the Public Sector: Legal and PracticalProblems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152, 152-58 (1971).
"I New York's Taylor Law has prompted the New York State Public Employment Relations Board to set up a small number of statewide bargaining units for
public employees. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAw §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973, McKinney
Supp. 1976), with standards for defining "the appropriate employer-employee negotiating unit" set out at N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAw § 207 (McKinney 1973). In Pennsylvania, one of the appropriateness criteria is consideration of "the effects of overfragmentization." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except firefighters and police). Additionally, the Wisconsin statute makes statewide
bargaining units presumptively appropriate for state employees and, as does Hawaii's statute, even has limited the number of statewide bargaining units. HAWAI
REV. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(3) (1974, Supp. 1976)
(state employees). New Jersey has shown a strong preference for statewide units.
E.g., State v. Patterson State Fed'n of College Teachers, 484 GERR F-1 (1972).
Alaska mandates that "unnecessary fragmenting shall be avoided." ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.40.090 (1972).
"I Collective bargaining is much more manageable in Philadelphia than in
New York City due to the lack of fragmentation of bargaining units. Rock, The
Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation,67
MICH. L. RaV. 1001, 1004-11 (1969). In New York City, as a result of political
considerations, over 800 separate certificates of representation were issued between
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bargaining units are as follows: They are easier and cheaper to
administer than smaller units;' 0 they are coterminous with broadscope collective bargaining and encourage bargaining with upper
echelon officials who possess adequate bargaining authority;'2 '
they aid in establishing uniform benefits for performance of similar
work, which, in turn, reduces personnel conflicts;'22 they largely
avoid the excessive competition spawned by a proliferation of rival
labor organizations;' 3 and they promote groupings of public employees who work under common benefit and classification programs, the same civil service system, and common laws and regulations. Arguments for smaller bargaining units are as follows:
They group together public employees of specialized interests and
needs, whose desires might be subjugated to majority wishes in a
larger unit;'' they may achieve better bargains at the negotiating
table for their members; and they are much easier to organize and
to promote unit solidarity within.'? At times, however, unions
have been inconsistent in their support of smaller bargaining
units.'
In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of bargaining with a
1958 and 1967, leading to "a crazy patchwork of bargaining units, excessive in
number and highly complicated." R. HORTON, supra note 40, at 32.
"I A. THOMPSON, UNIT DETERMINATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 19 (1967); H.
WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 108 (1971); Shaw & Clark,
supra note 117, at 175.
12,Rock, supra note 119.
I2 GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 24 (1966)
[referred to as the Taylor Report].
123 Rock, supra note 119. Larger units dampen union fervor to outdo their
competitors in seeking greater employee benefits, referred to as the "get-more syndrome." Friedman, Unit Determinations by Mini-PERB's, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR

511 (T.G.S.

Christensen ed. 1969).
,2 These groupings may be organized along skill, professional, social, or other
lines.
"2Rock, supra note 119.
2' Rival employee organizations occasionally take opposing sides on
two different unit questions. One will argue for a narrow unit in the first
situation and a wide unit in the second. Exactly the opposite position is
taken by the rival organization. There are internal, political, economic,
and technological reasons for such apparent contradictions.
Prasow, Principles of Unit Determination-Conceptand Problems, in PERSPECTIVE
INPUBLIC EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATION 61-62 (PERL Special Issue 1969). "The matter is
essentially a pragmatic issue." Statement of AFSCME general counsel, 436 GERR
AA-2 (1972).
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multitude of employee units, coalition bargaining'27 (where separate bargaining units bargain jointly with the governmental employer on all agency-wide issues) and multi-tier bargaining 2
(where tiered levels of employee units bargain on issues of concern
to the particular tier) have been tried. The effect of either scheme
is to limit the size of bargaining rather than to alter the size or
scope of bargaining units.
3.

Supervisors and Union Security

Two of the most troublesome representational policy issues
which have confronted state legislators are whether to include
supervisors in public employee bargaining units and whether to
allow some form of union security in these units. Each issue is
plagued with its own share of difficulties.
Supervisors 9 in the private sector are allowed to join unions
but almost always are denied protection by the LMRA. In public
sector bargaining units, some states have excluded supervisors, but
more states have included them, although managerial or confidential employees have been excluded. 3 ' The basic reason for including supervisors within the bargaining unit is that they-especially
"teachers, policemen, firemen, and social workers-have a strong
community of interest with the rank-and-file workers they supervise."'' Frequently, many of the supervisory duties common to the
I" E.g., Oregon, Rhode Island.
"2

E.g., Michigan, New York City.

"[Slupervisor" is statutorily defined as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
LMRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
'3 D. OWAGA & J. NAJrrA, supra note 115, at 8-10, 70-74. The statutory collective bargaining patterns regarding supervisors have been categorized as follows:
Exclusion of all supervisors, exclusion of bona fide supervisors, autonomous units
of supervisors with full bargaining rights, and autonomous units of supervisors with
meet and confer rights. Hayford & Sinicropi, The Bargaining Rights Status of
Supervisors in the Public Sector, IND. REL. (1976); Hayford, An EmpiricalInvestigation of the Public Sector Supervisory Bargaining Rights Issue, 26 LAB.L.J. 641
(1975).
"2

0,

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT

POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 97-98 (1970). However, a recent survey

of 266 municipalities and school districts in Iowa revealed that
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private sector do not inhere in public sector supervisors, whose
authority is circumscribed by civil service regulations and personnel departments;'32 hence, a definitional problem exists. Nonetheless, in opposition to the views of some commentators,'33 public
management pushes to exclude supervisors from bargaining units
in order to avoid conflicts of interest at the negotiating table and
in the grievance function.'34
An even more controversial representational issue which occurs in the public sector is whether state legislatures should authorize the negotiation of union security provisions, which in various manners guarantee inclusion of bargaining unit employees
within union membership and strengthen union solidarity.' ' By
[b]onafide supervisors generally viewed themselves (and all front line
supervisors) as being more closely identified with the management group
than with rank and file employees. The study showed that if allowed by
law to bargain collectively a majority of bonafide supervisors would not
choose to do so.
Hayford, supra note 130, at 649. Conversely, "[l]ess than bonafide supervisors
generally viewed themselves (and all front line supervisors) as being more closely
identified with rank and file employees ....

[and] . ..

a majority .

.

. would

choose [to bargain collectively]." Id. "Bonafide supervisors and less than bonafide
supervisors are unique from one another in terms of their identity groups, communities of interest, collective bargaining desires, and unit placement preferences." Id.
at 650.
M H. WELLNGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 120, at 113.
W3Pendleton, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Supervisors, in
REPoRTS 647-48 (1970); Schmidt, The Question of the Recognition of Principaland
Other Supervisory Units in Public Education Collective Bargaining, 19 LAB. L.J.
283 (1968); White, Rights and Responsibilitiesin Municipal Collective Bargaining,
22 ARB. J. 31 (1967).
I ADvisoRY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 131; H.
WELUNGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 120, at 113; Hayford, supra note 130, at 651-

53.

23 The types of union security provisions are as follows: Closed shop, requiring the employer to hire only union members and to discharge any employee who
will not join the union; union shop, requiring new employees to join the union
within a specified time and current union members to retain their memberships;
modified union shop, requiring new employees to join the union within a specified
time and current union members to retain their memberships but allowing current
nonunion members to retain that status; preferential shop, requiring employers to
give preference to union members in hiring; agency shop, requiring employees who
choose not to become union members to pay to the union an amount equal to the
customary initiation fee and the periodic dues required of members; maintenance
of membership, requiring union members to remain union members in order to
retain their jobs; maintenance of dues, requiring union members who withdraw
their memberships to pay dues for the life of the collective bargaining agreement;
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late 1975, just 13 states and the District of Columbia had authorized some form of union security.'3 A review of these statutes
prompts an admonition to other states to be cautious in drafting
union security legislation to avoid conflict with other statutory
guarantees.'- A concept related to union security is checkoff of
union dues by the public employer, which may be found in a number of state statutes.13
and fair share agreement, requiring employees who choose not to become union
members to contribute a pro rata share of bargaining costs.
' Alaska (public employees except teachers), Kentucky (firefighters), and
Washington (public employees) authorize collective bargaining as to all forms of
union security except the closed shop. ALASA STAT. § 23.40.110 (1972); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 345.050(c) (Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(1) (Supp.
1975). Delaware (certified public school employees) prohibits collective bargaining
only as to a union shop, while Hawaii (public employees) mandates a fair share
arrangement, and Rhode Island (state employees) mandates an agency shop. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4003(a) (1974); HAwAu REv. STAT. §§ 89-3 to -4 (Supp. 1975);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-2 (Supp. 1975); see Najita, The MandatoryAgency
Shop in Hawaii's Public Sector, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. RaV. 432 (1974). Michigan
(public employees) and Montana (public employees except charitable hospital
employees) authorize bargaining over an agency shop, while Vermont (municipal
employees) does the same except that an employer may not discriminate against a
nonpaying employee. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (1975); MONT. Rav. CODES
ANN. § 59-1605(c) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(a)(8) (Cum. Supp.
1976). Vermont (state employees) also allows payment of a fee equal to one year's
union dues for a grievance service performed. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 941(k) (1972
Replacement Edition). Pennsylvania (public employees except firefighters and police) authorizes bargaining as to a maintenance of membership dues provision. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705 (Supp. 1976). Massachusetts (public employees) and
Wisconsin (public employees) authorize bargaining over a fair share agreement.
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 12 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(1)(h), (2), .81(6),
.85 (1974). Minnesota (public employees except charitable hospital employees) and
Oregon (public employees) authorize bargaining over a similar provision requiring
payment of a pro rats share of costs incurred in the collective bargaining process.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1976); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 243.650(16), .672(c)
(1975 Replacement Part). For the most comprehensive article on point see Blair,
Union Security Agreements in PublicEmployment, 60 CORNELL L. Rev. 183 (1975).
For a collection of the statutes see J. NAirrA & D. OWAGA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INPUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: UNION SECURITY (1973).
'1 See Blair, supra note 136, at 210-19. For example, statutes that grant public
employees the right to join or assist a union, or refrain therefrom, or that prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees to encourage or discourage union
membership can be sources of conflict with union security provisions. Numerous
problems may also arise where union security clauses and civil service statutes
attempt to coexist.
IA E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.220 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1960 Replacement Volume); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-477 (1972) (municipal employees);
Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, § 11 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); DEL.
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Arguments advanced for allowing adoption of union security
clauses are that these provisions do the following: Require all public employees to share in the costs of union representation so that
no free-riders are present; stabilize labor-management relations by
discouraging rival unions and dissident bargaining unit members,
as well as by allowing unions to devote their energies to activities
other than dramatizing the advantages of membership; and grant
the employer bargaining leverage in states where union security is
not mandated.' Opponents of union security argue that union
security provisions do the following: Infringe upon the individual's
freedom of choice in job and union selection;' reduce the political
leverage of satellite personnel within unions, such as nonteaching
personnel who are locked into teacher bargaining units;' conflict
with both teacher tenure provisions' and merit systems;4 3 give
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4003(c) (1974) (certified public school employees); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1311 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.303 (Supp. 1976); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 89-4 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-8 (1975) (teachers); IND. ANN.
STAT. §'22-6-4-4 (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 345.110 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters); LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 23:890(F) (Supp. 1976) (transit workers); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 77, §§ 160(1), 160A(m) (1975 Replacement Volume) (public school employees in certain counties); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(5) (Supp. 1976) (public
employees except charitable hospital employees); MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN. § 591612 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except nurses and professional engineers);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:3(IV) (Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional university employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 105-B:7(IM) (Supp. 1973) (local government police); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 208(1) (McKinney 1973); ORE. Rav. STAT. §
243.672(C) (1975 Replacement Part); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705 (Supp. 1976)
(public employees except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-2
(Supp. 1975) (state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1734(a)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1976) (municipal employees); WASH. REy. CODE ANN. § 28B.16.100 (Supp. 1975)
(certain employees of state institutions of higher learning); WASH. Rsv. CODE ANN.
§ 41.56.110 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.59.060 (Supp. 1975) (certificated public school employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3)(a)(6) (1974) (municipal employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.84(1)(f) (1974) (state employees).
I NEv YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY, COST & FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY
& SECONDARY EDUCATION, 3 REPORT app. C, at 10-16 (1972).
"I Larson, Are You Making It Hard for Your Teachers Not To Join a Union?,
159 AM. SCHOOL BD. J., Mar. 1972, at 59.
- NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY, COST & FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY

& SECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 139.
142Id.
"I Anderson, Legal Aspects of Collective Bargainingin Public Employment,
in DEVELOPMENTS INPUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, supranote 69, at 146; Blair, supra
note 136, at 219; Waks, Impact of the Agency Shop on Labor Relations in the Public
Sector, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 547 (1970).
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majority unions an advantage over minority unions;'" raise substantial constitutional arguments;'45 enable unions to make political contributions and carry on effective political action programs;'48 and, at least beyond the amount of a fair share payment,
present unfairness.' As in the private sector, union security is an
issue of high emotional impact and engenders vigorous debate.
B.

Grievance Disputes

Contractual grievance procedures are designed to allow complainants, i.e., grievants, to raise issues of concern regarding the
application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. "The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process,"' 48 intended to clarify
contractual ambiguities and conflicts, and provides a necessary
safety valve for the employer-employee relationship. A typical private sector grievance provision allows for resolution of the complaint at several steps of the management hierarchy, starting with
an immediate supervisor and then proceeding up the management
structure, culminating in final and binding arbitration. 4 ' On occasion, management will initiate a grievance.
In the public sector, binding grievance arbitration was most
unusual at the beginning of the 1960's'5 ° but is quite common
today. 5 ' Generalizations about this process in governmental units
Najita, supra note 136, at 442-44.
Blair, supra note 136, at 190. These arguments fall within the first, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
M'Project: Collective Bargainingand Politics in Public Employment, supra
"
"

note 26, at 1037.
"7

Blair, supra note 136, at 219.

'5 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
"' In 1966, approximately 94 percent of the collective bargaining agreements
in the nation's most important industries provided for arbitration as the terminal
point of the grievance process. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsncS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTI E BARGADNNG AORFMENrs 5 (1966).
1'1Krislov, Prospectsfor the Use of Advisory GrievanceArbitrationin Federal
Service, 18 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 420, 422 (1965); Segal, GrievanceProceduresfor
PublicEmployees, 9 LAB. L.J. 921 (1958). In 1961, one investigator located for study

only 101 governmental units which had collective bargaining agreements containing
grievance-arbitration provisions (this does not, however, preclude the existence of

other such units). Krislov &Schmulowitz, GrievanceArbitrationin State and Local
Government Units, 18 ARm. J. 171 (1963).
"'

In 1967, the American Arbitration Association reported that "virtually every
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are difficult to make because of the sketchy information available.
Preliminary assessments of the current status of the governmental
grievance process show that it is slowly but surely emulating the
private sector grievance-arbitration model 5 ' as to procedures,"
issues, and standards applied by arbitrators.' 4
As in the private sector, the issues which may be grieved and
arbitrated in governmental employment are matters set forth in
the collective bargaining agreement. In contrast to the private sector, the scope of state and local government grievance procedures
is diverse,"" although the contractual provisions defining the arcollective bargaining agreement in the public sector

. . .

provides for arbitration

of grievances." 3 ARB. NEws, Mar. 1969. A more conservative estimate is that over
50 percent of public sector collective bargaining agreements include binding grievance arbitration. Howlett, supranote 77, at 32. A 1973 study of 118 of the 150 known
collective bargaining agreements in higher education revealed that 84 contracts
provided for binding grievance arbitration and 10 contracts provided for advisory
arbitration. Benewitz, A Modest Proposalfor Improving College Arbitration, 29
AaB. J. 43 (1974).
5I For the best general text about private sector arbitration see F. ELKoumi &
E. ELKouRi, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1973).
253 For a helpful primer on public sector arbitration procedures see A. ZACK,
UNDERSTANDING GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (U.S. Dep't of Labor
1974).
A study of 304 representative state and local government collective bargaining
agreements showed the following as to grievance procedures: Most were less specific
about details than private sector agreements; 9 percent "specified complete time
limits for union appeals of management decisions"; 75 percent "specified whether
the grievance should be written at some stage"; over 25 percent contained no
provision for handling impasses relating to arbitrator selection; only 25 percent
"specified general procedural rules for arbitration"; over 50 percent "did not specify
a time limit for appeal to arbitration or for arbitration selection"; and "60 percent
did not specify time limits for arbitration decisions." Ullman & Begin, The Structure and Scope of Appeals Procedures for Public Employees, 23 IND. & LAB. REL.
Rav. 323, 326 (1970).
25 TEELE, CHARAMuSTICS OF PURmLIc EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION UNDER A MASSACHUsrrrs LAW 239 (1969); Begin, The Private Grievance Model in the Public

Sector, 10 IND. REL. 21 (1971); Berger, The Grievance Process in the Philadelphia
Public Service, 13 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 568 (1960); Edmondson & Simon,
Arbitrationin HigherEducation,29 ARB.J. 217 (1974); Howlett, Arbitrationin the

Public Sector, in PROCEEDINGS

OF THE SoUTHwEsTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 15TH AN-

NUAL INsTrrTE ON LABOR LAw

262 (1969); Krislov & Peters, The Arbitration of

Grievances in EducationalUnits in the Late 1960's, 23 LAB. L.J. 25 (1972); Krislov
& Peters, GrievanceArbitrationin State and Local Government: A Survey, 25 AmB.
J. 196 (1970); Ullman & Begin, supra note 153.
"5 As related by Ullman and Begin, the scope of state and local grievance
procedures falls into the following four categories: (1) One-third of the contracts
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bitrability of disputes are similar.'56 Perhaps the factor which most

confines the scope of issues to be grieved and arbitrated is the
scope of public sector collective bargaining, which, in turn, determines the breadth of the collective bargaining agreement. Another
complicating factor is the overlapping of grievance procedures and
civil service appellate procedures.
If the grievance-arbitration procedure in the public sector,
encompassing disputes as to discharge and discipline, seniority,
and other topics for managerial decision, becomes as important as
industrial grievance-arbitration, that process will be part of the
core of the contractual relationship.'57 Unquestionably, private sector arbitration is still "the darling of national labor policy,"'," and
one wonders if arbitration can perform as important a role in governmental employment. Time will be the judge of how well the
adolescent public sector grievance-arbitration process matures and
changes" 9 and to what degree the resultant judicial doctrines mirror their private sector analogues. 60
contain very general definitions of grievance; (2) another one-third contain no definition [presumably all issues may be grieved]; (3) one-fifth of the contracts state
"that matters subject to the grievance procedure '[include] matters pertaining to
interpretation, application or violation of the contract' "; and (4) the final one-fifth
"limit the scope of the grievance procedures to the interpretation, application, or
violation of the contract." Ullman & Begin, supranote 153, at 331-32.
I~8 Id. at 332-33.
"' For a discussion of the importance of the private sector grievancearbitration process to the parties see S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIvERNASH, THE
IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 692 (1960).
S Both federal courts and the NLRB have given unwavering deference to the

arbitral process as the preferred method of fostering industrial self-government and
peaceful labor-management relations in the private sector. Meltzer, Ruminations
About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 545, 549 (1967).
I' The need for flexible arbitration procedures to adapt to changing times is
illustrated by the foundling expedited arbitration concept in the steel industry.
Using inexperienced young arbitrators, steel companies have attempted to combat
the shortage of experienced arbitrators and transform the too costly, too complex,
too lengthy, and too formal process into what the process is supposed to
be-"cheap, simple, quick and informal." Cohen, The Search for Innovative
Proceduresin Labor Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 106 (1974).
'1 Private sector judicial doctrines have revolved around compelling arbitration of disputes, deciding questions of arbitrability, and reviewing, enforcing, and
setting aside arbitration awards. Similar judicial functions have been cultivated in
the public sector labor-management system. See generally R. SMrrH, H. EDWARDS
& R. CLARK, JR., supra note 57, at 923-46.
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C.

Collective BargainingDisputes

Disputes occurring during the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement are common in both the public and private
sectors and usually reflect the parties' inability to compromise
divergent bargaining positions. For example, there is a strong tendency for public employee unions, especially those which represent
professionals, to attempt to bargain about policy matters, which
effort evokes fervent managerial resistance leading to frustrated
unions. Other collective bargaining disputes arise from employer
resistance to inclusion of controversial provisions, e.g., union security, within the written agreement or result from more mundane,
yet important, matters such as wage increases and reduced working hours.
The primary determinant of the subjects which may be bargained about are the state collective bargaining statutes. By late
1975, the scope of public sector collective bargaining was described
in various ways as follows: 30 states imitated the private sector
model of wages, hours, and working conditions or had similar terminology;'' nine states and the District of Columbia potentially
"I AL.. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (firefighters); CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 3504 (Deering 1973) (local government employees); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3529
(Deering 1973) (state employees); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (Deering 1976) (firefighters); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(a) (1972) (municipal employees); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 10-153b(c), (e), -153d, -153g (Supp. 1976) (teachers); Conn.

Pub. A. No. 75-566, §§ 2(a), (c) (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4006 (1974) (certified public school employees); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, §§ 1301(3), (5) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1304 (1974) (firefighters in cities
abdve 20,000); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 44-1802 (Supp.
1976) (firefighters); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-3-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (firefighters); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 328a (Smith-Hurd 1966) (transit workers);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-7.5-1-4, -5 (1975) (teachers); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-6-4-1(k)
(Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.480
(Supp. 1976) (county police); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.030, .050(3) (Supp. 1976)
(firefighters); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(C) (1964) (municipal employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(1)(E) (1964) (state employees); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(1)(C) (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 64B, § 37(b) (1972 Replacement Volume) (transit workers); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 77, §§ 160(b), (h), 160A(b), (h) (1975 Replacement Volume) (public
school employees in certain counties); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, §§ 2, 6 (1976);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(11), (15) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.63(18),
.65(4), .66(2) (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.520 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except deputy
sheriffs, highway patrolmen, national guard, police, and teachers); MONT. REV.
CODEs ANN. §§ 59-1603(1), (3), -1605(3) (Supp. 1975) (public employees except
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had narrowed the private sector model to terms or conditions of
employment or similar wording;" 2 three states did not define the
scope of collective bargaining;" 3 three states allowed the parties to
determine the scope of negotiations;'6" various states had added
provisions relating to specific subjects;"' and 15 states and the
District of Columbia had specifically authorized bargaining about
grievance-binding arbitration procedures." 6
nurses and professional engineers); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.033, .150 (1975) (local
government employees); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 201(4), 203-04 (McKinney 1973,
McKinney Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-09 (1971 Replacement Volume)
(teachers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 548.2, .3(7), .4(A) (Supp. 1976) (firefighters,
municipal employees, police); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-4 (1968) (firefighters);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.2-4 (1968) (police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-2
(1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.4-3 (1968) (municipal employees
except firefighters, police, and teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-1(a) (Supp.
1975) (state employees); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1, § 5(a), 7(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(state employees, state college employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2004 (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1725(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.030(4), .58.040(1) (Supp. 1975);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.59.020(2) (Supp. 1975) (certificated public school employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(1)(d) (1974) (municipal employees); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-266 (1967 Replacement Volume) (firefighters); 49 Op. W. VA. ATr'y GEN.
448 (1962) (employees of county boards of education).
162 ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070(2), .250(1) (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
447.203(14), .301(2) (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5414 (1972) (teachers);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4324, -4327(a), (b), -4330 (Supp. 1975) (public employees

except teachers);

NEB. REV. STAT.

§§ 48-816, -837 (1974); N.H.

REV. STAT. ANN. §

98-C:4 (Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional university employees); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.662 (1975 Replacement
Part); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-2 (1974); Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 14,
1971); see 1 APP. D.C. CODE ANN., ORG. ORD. No. 25 (1973).
10 Idaho (municipal employees), Utah, and Virginia.
...IDAHO CODE

§ 33-1271 (Supp. 1976) (teachers);

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 20.9

(Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1292 (1971) (teachers).
"65ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.550 (1975) (teachers-fulfillment of professional
duties); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (Deering Supp. 1976) (public school employees-right to consult on educational objectives, course content and curriculum, and

textbook selection);

MONT.

REV.

CODES

ANN.

§ 41-2201 (Supp. 1975)

(nurses-desirable employment practices); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:4(I)(d)
(Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional university employees-mediation and factfinding); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.6 (1972) (school employees-items affecting performance of professional services); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28B.52.030
(Supp. 1975) (community college academic employees-school policies).

"I ALASKA

STAT.

§ 23.40.210 (1972);

HAWAn REV. STAT.

§§ 89-10(a), -11 (Supp.

1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-4 (1975) (teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5424
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Further limitations upon the scope of governmental collective
bargaining are found in civil service statutes, various statutory and
constitutional provisions, management rights clauses, and judicial
decisions interpreting these laws. Some state statutes specifically
exclude matters from the scope of collective bargaining. Another
common practice is to categorize issues as either mandatory or
permissive subjects of collective bargaining.
Some confusion exists as to the scope of public sector collective bargaining where there is diffusion of authority among governmental units over the conditions of public employment.' 7 In general, state legislatures are empowered by their state constitutions
to establish employment conditions for state employees. This
power, in part, has been delegated to various state officials and
agencies. A common practice, however, is for various state legislatures to retain this power as it relates to implementation of conditions of state employment requiring state tax expenditures. At the
municipal level, power to deal with municipal employment conditions sometimes is retained by state legislatures but more often is
delegated to the cities. If a state constitutional home-rule provision
exists, either the municipality is empowered to regulate municipal
employment conditions directly, or state legislatures are required
to enact state statutes delegating such powers to local governments. In either situation the municipality is obligated to exercise
(1972) (teachers); KAN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 75-4330(b), -4332(a) (Supp. 1975) (public

employees except teachers); ME. REv.

STAT.

ANN. tit. 26, § 970 (1964) (municipal

employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-K (1964) (state employees); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1031 (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MASS. ANN.
LAWS

ch. 150E, § 8 (1976);

MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 179.38 (Supp. 1976) (charitable

hospital employees) (mandatory grievance procedure); MINN.

STAT.

ANN. § 179.70

(Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees) (mandatory
grievance procedure); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:4(c) (Supp. 1973) (state and
nonprofessional university employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-B:14 (Supp.
1973) (local government police); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1976) (mandatory grievance procedure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.12 (Supp. 1976)
(firefighters, police); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.706, .762 (1975 Replacement Part); PA.
tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters
and police) (mandatory arbitration); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 3-18-2 (1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(2) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
STAT. ANN.

111.84(1)(e), (2)(d) (1974) (state employees); 1 APP. D.C. CODE ANN., ORG. ORD. No.

25 (1973).
"' For an enlightening article on point see Blair, State Legislative Control over

the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of CollectiveBargaining
for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1973).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss1/4

52

Kincaid: Resolving Public Employment Disputes: A Guide for West Virginia

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTES

its powers in accordance with state law, except where matters of
68
local concern are vested solely within municipal discretion.
On account of this diffusion of power, preexisting statutes are
often a source of conflict with collective bargaining laws, as is
illustrated by the overlapping of civil service personnel policies and
the same matters as encompassed within the scope of collective
bargaining subjects. Where such a conflict exists, legislatures are
obligated to provide a statutory solution to the problem. 6 A less
common statutory conflict arises where teacher tenure statutes
have been enacted.' Finally, home rule charter provisions of municipalities at times conflict with state collective bargaining statutes.'
The collective bargaining statute, itself, may restrict the scope
of bargaining by expressly precluding negotiations of matters such
as civil service policies, educational policies, and inherent managerial decisions. The same effect is accomplished by the use of statutorily prescribed management rights clauses,7 2 which are quite
I-1 See generally Sandalow, The Limits of MunicipalPower Under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 MiNr. L. REv. 643 (1964).
I While various solutions exist as to the coiiflict between civil service policies
and the scope of collective bargaining, usually that of making one or the other
statutory scheme superior, Connecticut offers a compromise solution. As explained
and endorsed by one authority, in Connecticut the employment and promotion
functions of the merit system are excluded from collective bargaining, but negotiated agreements prevail otherwise (so long as they are consistent with constitutional and other statutory standards). Kilberg, AppropriateSubjects for Bargaining
in Local Government Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. Rav. 179, 195-96 (1970).
I For a discussion of the conflict between teacher tenure provisions and bargaining subjects see Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector Bargaining:An Essay
Dedicated to Nathan P. Feinsinger,1973 Wis. L. REv. 986, 1003.
" In Michigan, municipal home rule charter provisions dealing with uniform
pay plans and municipal employee residency requirements have been litigated
when they were in conflict with state collective bargaining statutes. See Edwards,
The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MIcH. L. Rav. 885, 912
(1973).
"I A model management rights clause, suggested by the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, reads in part as follows:
State labor relations laws should provide that public employers retain the
unrestricted right: (a) to direct the work of their employees; (b) to hire,
promote, demote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions
within the public agency; (c) to suspend or discharge employees for
proper cause; (d) to maintain the efficiency of governmental operations;
(e) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or for other
legitimate reasons; (f) to take actions as may be necessary to carry out
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common.' 7 3 Another way in which collective bargaining statutes
determine the scope of negotiations is statutory ambiguities' or
conflicts,' 75 compelling judicial interpretation of statutory provisions. Lastly, statutes sometimes provide wide avenues for bargaining, such as where certain educational policies are negotiable
or where productivity bargaining ' is allowed.
One of the controversial areas of concern in the scope of governmental bargaining is the desire by many professional employees
to negotiate about policy-making. This desire is fueled by the professional employee's quest for intellectual status equivalent to
management's, a resistance to traditional management-oriented
the mission of the agency in emergencies; and (g) to determine the methods, means and personnel by which operations are to be carried on.
51 GERR, RF 101, 112 (1973).
'7 Management rights clauses exist in the public employment statutes
of
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mon.
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally
J. NAurrA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN THE PUBUC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:

SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS

(1973).

As with any legislative statute in which terms are general in nature, some
forum must be the arbiter of legislative intent. Query: What is a "working condition"?
The trend in public sector bargaining statutes is to enumerate bargainable and
nonbargainable subjects. Those states which follow the private sector example and
use the broad mandatory-permissive scheme of defining bargainable subjects, however, leave the determination of bargainable subjects to the courts or public employment relations boards. Since the private sector mandatory-permissive distinction is based on the premise that private employee unions can strike after a bona
fide impasse is reached as to mandatory subjects (but neither party may insist to
impasse regarding permissive subjects), the dichotomy makes little sense in the
public sector, where the right to strike is rare. Kilberg, supra note 169, at 187-89.
11 Where the definition of bargainable subjects is phrased as wages, hours, and
working conditions, or in similar language, and the state legislature is not included
within the collective bargaining statute as an employer, a conflict will appear
whenever public employees seek to bargain about subjects which traditionally may
be regulated by the legislature through its exercise of undelegated powers or which
have already been regulated by the legislature prior to enactment of the collective
bargaining statute. See Blair, supra note 167, at 10-17.
127 Productivity bargaining involves labor-management efforts to negotiate
improved worker benefits in exchange for increased productivity through modification of work rules and the use of incentive systems. See generally J. GREINER, TYING
CrrY PAY TO PERFORMANCE (LMRS 1974); H. HATRY &0. FISK, IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (National Comm'n
on Productivity 1971).
I
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principles,' 7 and the fact that policy decisions directly affect working conditions. In particular, teachers often have been adamant in
seeking to bargain about policies affecting their professional judg8
ment, professional growth, and professional status.""
Interestingly
enough, New York, which has a collective bargaining statute allowing binding contracts on educational policy issues but does not
mandate bargaining as to these issues, and California, which has
a meet and confer statute requiring only that school boards discuss
educational policy issues, have produced similar impacts upon the
determination of educational policies. 7 9 In addition to teachers,
employees in the public health and safety fields have sought to
bargain about policies of substantial public concern. 8 ' Whether
the negotiation of policy issues affecting the working conditions of
public employees is considered to be unwise or to be a blessing
depends largely upon one's viewpoint.'8 '
17 Johnson & Hill, Managements' Dilemma-The Professional Employee, 5
CAL. MANAGEMENT REv., spring 1963, at 37, 41.
17 In greater detail, teacher concerns are threefold: (1) professional judg-

ment-curriculum development, textbook selection, innovation and experimentation, instructional techniques, planning of new buildings, (2) professional
growth-conferences, observation visits, sabbatical leaves, restrictions to areas of
competence, and (3) professional status-academic freedom, professional ethics,
student discipline, class size, teacher aides, extracurricular work, teacher personnel
files. For an analysis of the experiences of New York and California as to these
issues see Comment, Teacher Collective Bargaining-Who Runs the Schools?, 2
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 505 (1974). See also Jascourt, Faculty Collective Bargaining
in Higher Education:An Overview, 3 J. LAW & EDUC. 409 (1974).
For a detailed analysis of the class size issue see J. WErrZMAN, THE SCOPE OF
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 247 (1975). Weitzman leaves no doubt that
teachers will continue to push hard for negotiation of optimum class size (from the
teachers' perspective).
'"I Comment, supra note 178, at 559. As stated in that article: "[N]o significant diminution of the local school boards' control over the formation of educational
policy was observed . . . . [T]he most significant intrusions of teachers in this
area were agreements and contracts establishing a system of formal advice and
consultation." Id. at 560.
I" In arguing against inclusion of public health and safety issues within the
class of bargaining subjects, one commentator points to the efforts by New York
City police and firefighters to bargain about the number of personnel to be assigned
to police cars and fire engines, respectively. Kilberg, supra note 169, at 196.
M0For a situation in point see Dunlop, MajorIssues in New Sector Bargaining,
in S. WOLFHEIN, EMERGING SECTORS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 19 (1970). In his
article, Dunlop suggests that inclusion of limitations on class size in collective
bargaining agreements (to counter employer efforts to increase class size in return
for wage increases) freezes class size, producing an obstacle to adaptation to future

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

55

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 4
[Vol. 79

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

What should be the scope of governmental collective
bargaining?'82 Proponents of broad-scope collective bargaining
argue that placing excessive restrictions on what may be negotiated will not foster harmonious governmental labor-management
relations; will ensure bilateralism to be an employer-dominated
process; will not keep pace with developments in the private sector, particularly as to management rights clauses (which are negotiated, not legislated); will encourage lobbying and other political
activities;' 3 and will inhibit the effective functioning of professionals. Opponents of broad-scope collective bargaining usually argue
that important areas of decision-making should be left to public
management so as to ensure that these decisions are not removed
from the ordinary political process, such decisions' being related
to "inherent" managerial functions (goals, discipline, staffing,
etc.), public health and safety, and continuation of established
principles such as the merit principle. Under this latter view,
collective bargaining is appropriate where budgetary and, perhaps,
level of service considerations are dominant.'84 Which view should
prevail, of course, is a matter of much rhetoric and debate.'5
needs. Nevertheless, in late 1975, New York City teachers struck to restore limitations on class size.
"3 For a fine summary of opposing viewpoints on the scope of collective bargaining see J. WEITZMAN, supra note 178, at 72-90.
"3 Lowenberg, Policemen and Firefighters, in S. WOLFBEIN, supra note 181, at
159. See J. SEIDMAN, THE HAWAII LAW ON
EMPLOYMENT (1973).

COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING IN PUBUC

Summers, supra note 29, at 1192-97.
The special political structure and procedure of collective bargaining
is particularly appropriate for decisions where the employees' interests in
increased wages and reduced work load run counter to the combined
interests of taxpayers and users of public services. Therefore, decisions
as to wages, insurance, pensions, sick leave, length of work week, overtime pay, vacations, and holidays should be considered proper subjects
for bargaining.
Id. at 1194.
"5 For several interesting scope of bargaining proposals, discussed despite all
the rhetoric, see Wellington & Winter, supra note 85, at 868-70. In Maine, collective
bargaining is required as to wages, hours, working conditions, and contract grievance arbitration, whereas public employers are reluired to meet and confer with
teachers with respect to educational policies. As alternatives to the Maine approach, Wellington and Winter suggest the following: Multi-party bargaining as to
subjects relating to employee services, such as employer-employee-community bargaining about educational policies, intervention of third parties into negotiations
by petition or procedures requiring a referendum upon aspects of the negotiated
agreement, e.g., San Francisco's approach, and the use of advisory commissions to
'"
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In summary, the nature of collective bargaining disputes is
shaped in large part by legislative, judicial, and administrative
determinations of the scope of collective bargaining. Practical considerations of political lobbying and extensiveness of bargaining
units'88 are two common factors and, thus, are also shaping forces.
When public managers and unions are unable to consummate an
agreement, numerous methods have been devised to encourage or
impose resolution of these collective bargaining disputes. The next
portion of this paper will explore the various dispute resolution
mechanisms.
IH.

METHODS OF RESOLVING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT DIsPUTES

Public employment disputes essentially stem from the
administration and negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, resolution of public employment disputes is
performed by enforcement of that agreement and by ending impasses in negotiations.
A.

Enforcement of the Collective BargainingAgreement

Public employment relations boards, courts, public management, and public employee unions are intimately involved in the
enforcement of contractual and statutory obligations relating to
the collective bargaining agreement. Some of these obligations are
at the heart of representational and grievance disputes, as discussed previously, and require little elaboration. Representational
disputes are most often resolved by public employment relations
boards, while grievance disputes are usually settled by the parties
or by arbitrators, in which case judicial enforcement of contractual
obligations is precluded,'87 absent fraud, lack of substantive arbihold hearings and propose legislative modification of the collective bargaining
statute. Id.
Will the scope of public employment bargaining be expanded as desired by
public employee unions and opposed by public management? In describing how
Michigan's PERB has performed well in giving flexibility to the mandatorypermissive dichotomy of bargainable subjects, one scholar, based upon the experiences of Michigan, New York, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, predicts an expanded
scope of public employment bargaining. Edwards, supra note 171, at 916-23.
"IM
Unions representing smaller bargaining units have demonstrated interest in
membership concerns and frequently are disinterested in issues affecting employerwide units or broad-based units within multilevel bargaining units.
" R. SMrrH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., supra note 57, at 916.
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trability, a breach of the union's duty of fair representation to its
members, or noncompliance with the arbitral award.
Once the collective bargaining agreement has been executed,
the trend of the law is that the public employer must do everything
reasonably within its power to implement the agreement. Accomplishment of this objective is aided by two practices.1 8 First, the
public employer can make economic benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement a priority item in its budget.' 8 Second, the
public employer can make the appropriate legislative body aware
of the fiscal need to fulfill contractual obligations. Legislative
awareness of executive fiscal needs has been facilitated by direct
participation of the legislative body in collective bargaining,' 0 by
submission of tentative agreements to the legislative body for approval,' 9 ' and by coordination of collective bargaining and budgetmaking deadlines.'92 Legislative consideration also should be given
See Edwards, supra note 171, at 929-32.
In State v. AFSCME Local 1726, in which the court legitimized a contractual insurance provision but stated it could not compel payment of insurance premium money until those funds were appropriated properly, the court admonished
the State Department of Health and Social Services to "pursue every step within
its power to see that the insurance is provided." 298 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. Ch. 1972).
Other judicial bodies have instructed legislative bodies to honor their contractual
monetary commitments to public employees. E.g., Scituate v. Scituate Teachers
Ass'n, 110 R.I. 679, 296 A.2d 466 (1972); Wheatley v. Covington, 440 GERR B-3
(Ky. Cir. Ct. 1972); Union Free School Dist. No. 5, 5 N.Y. PERB 3101 (1972).
Vermont (municipal employees) has made the employer's failure to appropriate funds to implement contractual requirements an unfair labor practice, whereas
Indiana (teachers) prohibits deficit financing for contractual obligations and Iowa
provides for reduction of contractual benefits or for further bargaining when legislative funding is inadequate. IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-3 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §
20.17(6) (Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(a)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" E.g., Milwaukee (weak mayor-strong city council).
"'

"'

"'

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 75-4330(c) (Supp. 1975) (public employees except teach.

ers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.92 (1974) (state employees).
,"2 Several states have enacted legislation tying together collective bargaining
and budget-making deadlines. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474 (1972, Supp. 1976)
(municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1976) (teachers);
Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, § 9 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 7 (1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-837 (1974); N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW §§ 204-a, 208(2) (McKinney 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-13 (1968)

(firefighters); R.I.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

§ 28-9.2-13 (1968) (police); R.I.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

§ 28-9.3-8 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.4-9 (1968) (municipal
employees except firefighters, police, and teachers); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.92 (1974)
(state employees). See Derber, Jennings, McAndrew & Wagner, Bargaining and
Budget Making in Illinois PublicInstitutions, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 49 (1973).
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to the effect of "sunshine" laws in disclosing the substance of
negotiations at the bargaining table.
Most states have adopted the private sector concept of unfair
labor practices as a means of enforcing contractual and statutory
responsibilities.'9 3 Like the private sector, public employment relations boards or, in their absence, the courts determine and remedy
unfair labor practices. Yet, unlike the single example provided by
the private sector, public sector bargaining statutes have experimented with a number of unfair labor practice concepts.' 9' With
"13 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110 (1972); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-470 (1972,
Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, § 3 (Appendix
Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-13 (Supp. 1975); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-7 (1975) (teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4333 (Supp. 1975)
(public employees except teachers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 345.050, .070 (Supp.
1976) (firefighters); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 964 (1964) (municipal employees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-C (1964) (state employees); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1027 (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77,
§§ 160(j), 160A(k) (1975 Replacement Volume) (public school employees in certain
counties); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 10 (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(10),
(16) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.68 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except
charitable hospital employees); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2203 (Supp. 1975)
(nurses); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 59-1605, -1607 (Supp. 1975) (public employees
except nurses and professional engineers); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6120 (1971
2d Replacement Volume) (teachers); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.270 (1975) (local government employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 105-B:11 (Supp. 1973) (local government police); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a (McKinney 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 548.3(8) (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, municipal employees, police); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 243.672, .676 (1975 Replacement Part); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201
(Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-9.3-6 (1968) (teachers), referring to R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-7-13 (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.4-7 (1968) (municipal employees except firefighters, police,
and teachers), referring to R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-7-13 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 36-11-6 (1970) (firefighters, police, state employees), referring to R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§ 28-7-1 to -47 (1968, Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961-62 (1972
Replacement Edition) (state employees, state college employees); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1726-27 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); 1 App. D.C. CODE,
ORG. ORD. No. 25(M) (1973); for New Mexico's concept, defined in accordance with
regulations of the State Personnel Board, see 51 GERR, RF-99, at 4018-19 (1975).
"' For a list of novel unfair labor practice concepts collected from public sector
bargaining statutes see Howlett, supra note 77, at 15-16. The provisions include the
following: Refusal to comply with the statute [Indiana (teachers), South Dakota],
racial discrimination (District of Columbia, New Mexico, Vermont), engaging in a
strike [Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana (teachers), New Hampshire (police),
New Mexico (state employees), Pennsylvania], locking out [Kansas, New Hampshire (police), Oklahoma], failure to comply with impasse and mediation procedures [Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire (police), Pennsylvania], denying recognition rights to a certified or recognized union [District of Columbia,
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regard to unfair labor practices, however, it is fair to say that most

of these state statutes are 9less
comprehensive than the Labor5
Management Relations Act.

An unexplored area of governmental labor-management relations is the effectiveness of the methods used to enforce collective
bargaining responsibilities. Private sector experience teaches that
legislative drafters neglected this most important topic when creating the Labor-Management Relations Act.' Since many states,
along with the private sector, have sought to enforce the duty to
bargain in good faith through the unfair labor practice device,
legislators should be diligent to ensure effective enforcement of
collective bargaining duties.'97 The trend among the states is to
encourage public management and public employment unions to
resolve their collective bargaining differences with the help of neutral third parties whenever an impasse in negotiations is reached.
Accordingly, as opposed to the private sector, where an employer
may implement its best offer after a bona fide impasse in negotiations has been reached, public employers may not unilaterally
implement their bargaining offers (mandatory subjects of bargaining) "until after all impasse procedures have been exhausted."'98
New Mexico (state employees), Vermont], failure to comply with contract (Hawaii,
Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon), engaging in politics [Kansas, Montana (using
agency shop fees to support political parties)], blacklisting of employees [Maine,
Minnesota, New Hampshire (police), Rhode Island], interfering with management's rights (New Hampshire), and extortion (Vermont). Id.
" Public sector collective bargaining statutes rarely regulate secondary boy-

cotts and jurisdictional strikes, for example. Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, however, do regulate these two facets of governmental labor-management
relations. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.68(3)(6), (7) (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except charitable hospital employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1201 (b)(6),
(7) (Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters and police); VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 3, §§ 962(6), 964 (1972 Replacement Edition) (state employees, state college
employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (municipal
employees).
"I Congressional oversight hearings on this subject were begun in the early
months of 1976.
I" Only time will tell how effective the unfair labor practice device is for
enforcing the duty to bargain in good faith in the governmental labor-management
arena. In the private sector, neither party can be compelled to concede on any
contractual issue, so hard bargaining is permissible; hence, the NLRB's lack of
power to force concessions, combined with administrative and judicial delay and

the inability to exact punitive measures, make the NLRB a toothless tiger when
enforcing the duty to bargain in good faith.
"I Edwards, supra note 171, at 924.
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B. Impasse Resolution
Procedures designed to encourage or impose resolution of
collective bargaining impasses in the governmental sector are varied, and most state statutes require multiple forms of impasse
resolution. 9' A major underlying purpose of collective bargaining
impasse resolution mechanisms is to avoid public employee
strikes, but these measures should not be viewed as substitutes for
good faith bargaining. 0° Methods of impasse resolution are as
follows: Strikes (after failure of conciliation efforts), mediation,
factfinding, voluntary interest arbitration, compulsory interest
arbitration, and some variations of these concepts.
1. Strikes
In response to the inevitability of some strikes 20' and to the
undesirability of compulsory interest arbitration, 22 as well as to
"' See generally T. GILROY & A. SINICROpi, DispuTE SETTLEMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR, (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1972).
ImThere simply cannot be an effective ban on strikes if public employees believe that they are being treated in a relatively unfair fashion,
unless, perhaps, we were prepared to accept the consequences of a major
political crisis in which the ultimate coercive power of the state were used
on a large scale against its own employees.
Wellington & Winter, supra note 85, at 824. The quoted passage has particular
applicability to economic strikes occurring during the course of collective bargaining negotiations, resolutions of which can be aided by impasse resolution mechanisms.
Two authors recommend that, in addition to reducing the frequency of strikes
by increasing the competence of labor relations personnel, recognition strikes can
largely be avoided through secret ballot elections, jurisdictional strikes can be
minimized by LMRA-type machinery to resolve the underlying dispute, and strikes
occurring during the term of the agreement can be greatly reduced by grievancearbitration procedures. Shaw & Clark, supra note 85, at 233-34.
"I "Neither sanctions nor impasse procedures, alone or in combination, can do
more than ease the situation. In some cities and states this will be enough. . . . In
other localities, the prohibition on strikes may not work, no matter what." Wellington & Winter, supra note 85, at 842. Of interest is one analysis of teacher strikes in
27 states, which shows that teacher strikes, presumably exclusive of recognition
strikes, have not lessened but have tended to increase following enactment of collective bargaining legislation. Thornton & Weintraub, Public Employee Bargaining
Laws and the Propensity to Strike: The Case of Public School Teachers, 3 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONs 33 (1974).
2 Although the strike is technically illegal in Minnesota, a successful defense
to the strike prohibition is the public employer's refusal to submit a bargaining
dispute to binding arbitration or to abide by the arbitral award, assuming the
employees are not engaged in essential services and are not charitable hospital
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notions of employee freedom, a few states have authorized
nonessential-personnel strikes after exhaustion of statutory impasse resolution procedures. Since these statutes were discussed
previously, attention will be devoted to several thought provoking
proposals. Where legislatures have legalized some form of governmental striking, public employers would be well advised to begin
contingency planning to withstand the adverse effects of a strike." 3
Use of the conventional strike as a part of the bargaining
dispute resolution process in Canada serves as a possible model for
United States legislation. 4 In Canada, the public labor organization must choose between two procedures for resolving a collective
bargaining impasse: (1) conciliation with the right to strike (for
basically nonessential employees) if conciliation fails to resolve the
impasse or (2) final and binding interest arbitration. American
versions of this plan would mandate mediation as a first step,
perhaps followed by factfinding; thereupon, the public employee
union would choose a strike or binding arbitration; then either a
tripartite panel or a court (upon petition by an affected citizen)
would sanction the strike if it did not threaten immediate danger
to public health or safety; and, finally, if the strike were unlawful,
further mediation, voluntary arbitration, or compulsory arbitra20 5
tion would be in order.

Use of the nonstoppage strike and the graduated strike are
alternatives to the conventional strike. The nonstoppage strike "is
no strike at all. It is

. .

.designed to impose the costs of a strike

employees. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966) (charitable hospital employees);
§ 179.64 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospi-

MINN. STAT. ANN.

tal employees).
203The following have been suggested as possible employer strategies to
counter public employee strikes: Use.of alternative medical facilities (hospital
strike) and alternative traffic/parking patterns (transit strike), automation, prepared instructions for consumers, partial operations, notification of voters of the
employer's bargaining position by publishing employee salary lists and by specifying in tax bills where expenditures go, creation of tax districts coextensive with

bargaining units, and public referenda on negotiated contracts. Wellington & Win-

ter, supra note 85, at 847-52.
120
See generally Coughlin & Rader, Right to Strike and Compulsory
Arbitration: Panacea or Placebo, 58 MARQ. L. Rv. 205, 220 (1975); Kruger,
CanadianLegislation and Experience, 21 LAB. L.J. 455 (1970).
" Wollett, Mutual Anxiety: A CaliforniaProposal, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REv.,
Sept. 1973, at 51; Zack, Arbitration and Fact-finding in Public Disputes, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON

LABOR, supra note 123, at 535, 543-45.
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upon the parties to an impasse without a concomitant cessation of
work."2 6 After impasse in negotiations, the public employee union
could call a nonstoppage strike, wherein the employees would continue to work as, each week, a portion of their take-home pay
would be placed in a special fund, which would be matched by an
equivalent sum from the employer. The union would be empowered to increase the sum placed in the fund each week by both
parties, but the employer could require the union to switch to a
graduated strike. Money tucked away in the fund would be allocated for desirable public projects by a special community committee."' In a graduated strike the daily number of hours worked
by public employees would be reduced gradually with a resulting
loss of services to the public employer and loss of wages to the
employees.20
The foregoing authorities propose use of the strike threat to
encourage consummation of a collective bargaining agreement,
and implicit in their reasoning is the thought that "successful
avoidance of the strike is brought about substantially through perfecting procedures and policies to provide an effective alternative
2 3
to conflict.
2.

Mediation

Mediation of collective bargaining impasses occurs when a
neutral third party is called upon to help public management and
public employee unions voluntarily settle their differences and
reach an agreement. The success or failure of a mediator depends
upon his ability of persuasion only, for his function is to prod the
parties into meaningful negotiations.2 10 A mediator is obligated to
20' Harrison, The Strike and Its Alternatives: The Public Employment
Experience, 63 Ky. L.J. 431, 463 (1975).
"I For a detailed account of how the non-stoppage strike would function in
public employment see Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor
Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1971).
"I See id.; Brookshire & Holly, Resolving BargainingImpasses Through Gradual Pressure Strikes, 24 LAB. L.J. 662 (1973).
200 Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedure&, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
617, 635 (1967).
210 The role of a mediator was described by W. E. Simkin, former head of
FMCS, as follows:
At one end, the spectrum begins by a decision not to intervene at all-to
provide no third party assistance. At the other end of the band, the
mediator can issue public recommendations: A major principle is to max-
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remove himself from a case when one of the following occurs: (1)
Agreement is reached; (2) one of the parties requests his departure;
(3) the agreed-upon time comes for appeal to the next step in the
procedure; or (4) he feels his acceptability or effectiveness is ex21
hausted".
In essence, a mediator's creed is that he "cannot begin
to be useful until he maintains a strong belief in the strengths of
the collective bargaining process. 2 1 2 Sometimes a mediator plays
a dual role-as mediator and factfinder or as mediator and arbitrator (med-arb).
imize bargaining and minimize the role of the mediator-to exercise
enough patience to let bargaining work. But the mediator must also be
able and willing to "grasp the nettle"-to recognize when patience is not
a virtue and to act accordingly. Most mediation decisions are decisions
as to strategy and timing-not decisions on the specified issues.
In the hands of a skilled mediator, facts are potent tools. It is seldom that
publication of facts is either necessary or desirable. But they can be most
useful in hard-hitting deflation of extreme positions. This is accomplished in separate head-to-head conferences or meetings, absent the
embarrassment of the other side's presence and certainly not in the press.
Public reference to the facts, if required at all, comes after a settlement
to help save face.
Speech by W. E. Simkin, in D. WoLLrr & D. SEA S, COLLECVE BABGAINING IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 201-02 (1971).
For another description of mediation see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, PICKETS
AT CITY HALL 21 (1970):
The function of mediation

. . .

is to maintain communication between

the parties, who may believe they have said everything they have to say
and done everything they are able to do; to inject a neutral presence into
what, because of the impasse, has become an adversary situation; to strip
away the nonessential matters and frame the core issues in dispute; and
to propose suggestions for settlement.
Mediation has no power to compel. It is fruitful only through logic
and persuasion.
See generally W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DISPurES
(1971); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1971).
2M1

SECTOR

A.

ZACK, UNDERSTANDING FACT FINDING AND ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC

(U.S. Dep't of Labor 1974).

212W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

29

(1971).
Mediation is sometimes distinguished from conciliation in that the latter
only assists the parties in reaching settlement of differences by suggesting
grounds for agreement whereas the mediation function adds to the process the intervenor's recommendations to the parties for settlement. As
a practical matter there is really no difference between mediation and
conciliation and the terms are usually used interchangeably.
P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 77, at 41.
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Mediation is the most commonly used method of resolving
public sector bargaining impasses." 3 At least 29 states provide for
some form of mediation of impasses in negotiations.2 1 1 One survey
211

Aaron, Final Report of the Assembly Advisory Council on Public Employee

Relations, in J.

GRODIN &

D. WOLLETT,

LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 251

(1975). In the first two to three years of New York's Taylor Law, nearly one-half of
all bargaining impasses acted upon by PERB were settled by mediation. Pegnetter, FactFindingand Teacher Salary Disputes: The 1969 Experience in New York
State, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 230 (1971Y. See also Helsby, Resolution of Public
Sector Labor Disputes, in J. FERGUSON & J. NAJITA, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, HAWAII PERB 16 (1971). Michigan, Connecticut, New Jer-

sey, Wisconsin, and Oregon also have relied heavily and successfully on mediation.
P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 77, at 48. A nationwide survey in 1973 of a multitude of
jurisdictions revealed that mediation was used to resolve a majority of bargaining

impasses. International Personnel Management Ass'n, Impasse Techniques
3139-48 (1973).

Survey, 1 PUB. PERSONNEL ADM'N/LAB. MANAGEMENT REL.

'" ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.570, .580 (1975) (teachers); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.190
(1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.2 (Deering 1973) (local government employees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-472 (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10-153f (Supp. 1976) (teachers); Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, §§ 7-8
(Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4010 (1974)
(certified public school employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO
CODE § 33-1274 (Supp. 1976) (teachers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.20 (Supp. 1976); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4332 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except teachers); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(2) (1964, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(2) (1964, Supp. 1976) (state employees); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(2) (university employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 160(i),
160A(i) (1975 Replacement Volume) (public school employees in certain counties);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9 (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.454(27), .455(7)
(1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable
hospital employees); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.525 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, national guard, police, and teachers);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1614 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except nurses
and professional engineers); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6123 (1971 2d Replacement Volume) (teachers); NEr. REv. STAT. § 48-816 (1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 791293 (1971) (teachers); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 288.063, .190 (1975) (local government
employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:4(I)(d) (Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional university employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-B:8 (Supp. 1973) (local
government police); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-2, -5.1, -6 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. CIv.
SERY. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973, McKinney Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1538-1-13 (1971 Replacement Volume) (teachers); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-11-01 to
-05 (1972 Replacement Volume); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.712 (1975 Replacement
Part); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801-.803 (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-9 (1968) (teachers);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-10, -17 (1968) (municipal employees except firefighters, police, and teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-8 (Supp. 1975) (state
employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-8.1 (1974), referring to S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 60-10-2 (1967); TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1, § 9(c) (Cum.
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of state mediation provisions relating to the public sector has revealed the following: Mediation is almost universally used in
connection with other bargaining impasse measures; most states
allow initiation of mediation by either party, but some states require both parties to request mediation services;" 5 there are a variety of types of state agencies offering mediation services; a single
mediator, as opposed to a mediation panel, is usually used; and
sometimes the parties share in the costs of mediation." 6
If there is one criticism about mediation, it is that mediation
is not used enough in the resolution of collective bargaining impasses. Although mediation and factfinding may be difficult concepts to distinguish in practice,- the two processes should remain
separate so as to encourage vigorous, voluntary collective bargaining. 1' 7 Similarly, resort to mediation should be withheld until
needed.2 18 When used appropriately, mediation serves as an educational tool for inexperienced negotiators219 and provides the parties
in the governmental sector with a last, or next to last, chance at
achieving a fully voluntary collective bargaining agreement.
Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 924(c), 925(d), (e)(Cum.
Supp. 1976) (state employees, state college employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §
2006 (Cum.Supp. 1976) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1731 (Cum.Supp.
1976) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.52.060 (Supp. 1975)
(community college academic employees); WAsH. Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.100,
.440, .58.020 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.59.120 (Supp. 1975) (certificated public school employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(4)(c)(1), .77(1)(e)
(1974) (municipal employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.87 (1974) (state employees).
2I In 1973, the FMCS announced a policy of serving as a source of mediators
where only one public sector party requested the services of a mediator, although
the FMCS usually declines to proffer its services when adequate state mediation
facilities exist. Howlett, supra note 77, at 24.
2I" Sinicropi & Gilroy, The Legal Framework of Public Sector Dispute
Resolution, 28 ARB. J. 6 (1973).
27 "All too often, the parties make only perfunctory use of mediation in their
unseemly haste to get on to the fact finding stage .... Only as a last resort should
the parties move on to fact-finding." T. GILROY, DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 17 (1972). To ensure the attractiveness of mediation as the preferred method
of resolving bargaining impasses, one commentator suggests barring the use of
mediation data in factfinding and compelling the parties in factfinding to share the
expenses. Zack, Improving Mediation and Fact Finding in the Public Sector, 21
LAB. L.J. 272 (1970).
21mThe Michigan experience with mediation shows that a state agency in its
early days of administering mediation procedures tends to apply the mediation
device too hastily. P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 77, at 53.
2 Gilroy & Sinicropi, Impasse Resolution in Public Employment: A Current
Assessment, 25 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 499 (1972).
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3. Factfinding
When mediation fails to end a collective bargaining impasse
in the public sector, factfinding, sometimes called advisory arbitration,2 0 is a logical next step-indeed, usually the terminal step
-in attempting to resolve the impasse. A general description of
the factfinding process is as follows:
In this procedure a neutral or neutrals, known as a fact finder
(or fact finding panel) conducts a hearing at which the opposing
parties define the issues in dispute and propose their prospective resolutions therefor with supporting evidence and argument. Following the hearing, the fact finder(s) issues recom22
mendations for a solution, usually in writing. '
Thus, the expression "factfinding" is a misnomer, for the concept
is much more complex than discovering facts. In any event, the one
aspect of factfinding which gives meaning to that process as an
impasse resolver is the neutral's recommendation.
Factfinding is a common provision of state public sector
collective bargaining statutes, 22 and its use antedates public em22a Strictly speaking, factfinding may or may not include recommendations to
the parties, whereas advisory arbitration always results in recommendations. Factfinding without recommendation is uncommon and ineffective. Factfinding with
recommendation resembles grievance arbitration but does not stem from an existing contract and is not final and binding.
2' A. ZACK, supra note 211, at 1.
2 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.160 (1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3548.1-.3 (Deering
Supp. 1976) (public school employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473 (1972, Supp.
1976) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153f(c) (Supp. 1976)

(teachers); Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566, § 8 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4010 (1974) (certified public school employees); GA.
CODE ANN. § 54-1309 (1974) (firefighters in cities above 20,000); HAWAn REV. STAT.
§ 89-11(b) (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 33-1275 (Supp. 1976) (teachers); IDAHO CODE
§§ 44-1805 to -1806, -1809 to -1810 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters); IOWA CODE ANN. §
20.21 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4330(b), -4332 (Supp. 1975) (public
employees except teachers); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 345.080 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(3) (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(3) (1964, Supp. 1976) (state employees); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(3) (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 150E, § 9 (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(27) (1975); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 59-1614 (Supp. 1975) (public employees except nurses and professional
engineers); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6123 (1971 2d Replacement Volume)
(teachers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1293 (1971)
(teachers); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.045, .110, .200-.220 (1975) (local government
employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:4(I)(d) (Supp. 1973) (state and nonprofessional university employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-B:8 (Supp. 1973) (local
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ployment bargaining statutes.22 Variations in state statutes
largely revolve around whether the parties or the state pays for
factfinding costs, 2 24 whether a single factfinder or a tripartite panel
of factfinders (with at least one neutral) is used,22 1 whether the
factfinder may also serve as a mediator, how budget-making and
factfinding deadlines are coordinated, whether a show-cause hearing is to be held if the parties do not abide by the factfinder's
recommendation, 2 1 whether further collective bargaining is mangovernment police); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-6(b) (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973, McKinney Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-38.103 to -06, -13 (1971 Replacement Volume) (teachers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
509.7 (1972) (school employees); ORE. Rsv. STAT. §§ 243.712, .722 (1975 Replacement Part); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.503, .802-.803 (Supp. 1976) (public
employees except firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-8 (Supp.
1975) (state employees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-8.1 (1974), referring to
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 60-10-2 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (state employees, state college employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2007
(Cum. Supp. 1976) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.52.060 (Supp. 1975) (community college academic employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.440 (Supp.
1975) (uniformed personnel); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.58.020 (Supp. 1975);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.59.120 (Supp. 1975) (certificated public school employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(c)(3) (1974) (municipal employees); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.88 (1974) (state employees); for the inclusion of a factfinding procedure
in the New Mexico State Personnel Board Regulations see 51 GERR, RF-99, at
4012, 4018 (1975).
21 Michigan initiated factfinding for public employees in 1954. Factfinding,
not widely used in the private sector, was originated in the Railway Labor Act of
1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970), and is part of the emergency strike provisions of
the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-83 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
22 Several states do pay for factfinding costs. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 8911(b)(4) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4323(c), -4332(e) (Supp. 1975) (public
employees except teachers); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(14.3) (1975) (hospital and
public utility employees); N.Y. CIv. SERY. LAW § 205(4) (a) (McKinney 1973). The
majority of states, however, require the parties to assume factfinding costs on the
theory that the parties' expenditures impose a burden on the parties sufficient to
deter half-hearted use of factfinding procedures.
'2 Tripartite factfinding panels, whose functions are to resolve public sector
bargaining impasses, usually consist of one neutral and one partisan from each side.
The main advantages of a tripartite factfinding panel are that, because of its makeup, partisan members give valuable advice and assistance to the neutral members
and that, after some horse trading leading to a unanimous recommendation, the
tripartite panel report invites acceptance by labor and management. A single factfinder's utility, however, rests with the quickness, efficiency, and thriftiness deriving from the simplicity of the sole factfinder process.
211A few states require the parties to present their respective positions to an
appropriate tribunal after failure to abide by the factfinder's recommendations.
E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4332(d) (Supp. 1975) (public employees except teach-
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dated after rejection of the factfinder's recommendation, and the
nature of the criteria used by the factfinder in making his decision
[Note: criteria to be discussed later under interest arbitration].
Most authorities are skeptical about the effectiveness of publishing the factfinder's report as a means of bringing public pressure to conclude a contract to bear on the parties; nevertheless, the
practice may be worthwhile at times. 22 On the other hand, most
commentators are optimistic about the usefulness of factfinding as
an impasse resolving tool, and available data bears witness to this
optimism.21 Even where the factfinder's recommendation does not

directly lead to settlement, his report may serve as a basis for
further negotiations. 22 Despite these indications of the success of
factfinding as a Solomon-like mechanism, the fear persists that
factfinding will become an automatic step in the collective bargaining process. 0 Also, to date, research on the impact of factfinders); N.Y. CiV. SERv. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Query: Should a
court or legislative body be authorized to impose a binding contract on a reluctant
party in governmental negotiations?
22 Publication of the factfinder's recommendation may backfire and cause
parties to become inflexible; therefore, the parties should be forewarned of publication, and their comments should be sought. See Krinsky, Avoiding Public Employee Strikes-Lessons from Recent Strike Activity, 21 LAB. L.J. 468 (1970).
21 Accepting the limitation that measurement of the effectiveness of factfinding is difficult, especially since comparison of the recommendation of a factfinder
with the negotiated settlement is not reported by most writers on the subject,
assessments concerning the efficacy of factfinding in resolving bargaining impasses
are positive. The factfinder's recommendation has been estimated to serve as a
basis for settling bargaining impasses in 60-70 percent of the cases going to factfinding. T. GILROY & A. SINICROPI, supra note 199, at 59. A more conservative estimate
of the success of factfinding, based upon the experiences of the states which use
factfinding most-New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and New Jersey-is that 40-60

percent of factfinders' reports are accepted by the parties. P. STAUDOHAR, supra note
77, at 70-77; cf. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SERVICE, FACTS ABOUT FACT-FINDING
(1973). But see Coughlin & Rader, supra note 204, at 232-33; Word, Implications
for Fact Finding: The New Jersey Experience, 3 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 339

(1974).
21 One survey indicates that public management and public labor unions in
New York frequently use the factfinder's report for further negotiations. B. YAFFE
& H. GOLDBLATT, FACT-FINDING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES IN NEW YORK STATE
41 (1971).
=3 One author uses the experiences of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, and Wisconsin to put this fear to rest by showing that 60-80 percent of
mediated cases were resolved without resort to factfinding. Anderson, The Use of
FactFindingin Public Employee Dispute Settlement, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTYSECOND ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 112-14 (1970). But see
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ing in inflating contractual settlements has been miniscule. 3'
Nevada's experiment with factfinding as a binding last step
in the collective bargaining continuum may be of interest to West
Virginia, which, like Nevada, has a relatively small population and
just a handful of urban centers. In Nevada's factfinding process the
parties may agree to final and binding recommendations or, at the
request of either party, elect to take their chances with the governor, who may order the factfinder's prospective report to be final
and binding.123 The unique feature of the Nevada approach is that
an elected official is empowered to give finality to the factfinding
33
process. In so doing, the governor is bound by statutory criteria,
and the factfinder, in turn, must use the employer's ability to pay
as an overriding precondition to a monetary award. 34 Preliminary
indications are that collective bargaining is blossoming in Nevada. 5
Word, supra note 228, at 38. For various suggestions as to how factfinding can be
improved see A. ZACK, supra note 211; Seamon, FactFinding in the PublicSector:
A Proposal to Strengthen the FactFinder'sRole, 3 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOrATIONS 121
(1974).
2' The 1966-1968 experience in Michigan found factfinding not to be a significant factor in inflating impasse settlements. Bain, Third-Party Settlements in
Education, 26 ARB. J. 41, 43-44 (1971). But, in New York during 1969, factfinders
relied heavily on area-wide teacher salary comparisons, thereby tending to inflate
salaries and fringe benefits for teachers. Pegnetter, supra note 213, at 242.
= NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.200(6)-(7) (1975) (local government employees).
2 The exercise of this authority by the governor shall be made on a
case by case consideration and shall be made on the basis of his evaluation regarding the overall best interests of the state and its citizens, the
potential fiscal impact both within and outside the political subdivision,
as well as any danger to the safety of the people of the state or a political
subdivision.
NEv. REV. STAT. § 288.200.7 (1975) (local government employees).
2u NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200(8) (1975) (local government employees).
"I One author credits Nevada's novel statute with fostering improved labormanagement relations in the public sector and comments as follows:
Nevada's experience is not for everyone. The sort of personal role
that the governor has played in that state is based on a familiarity with
local conditions and personnel that would be unlikely in larger states, and
the impact of such a scheme is also bound to be different where there exist
well-developed bargaining relations, militant unions, and the potential
for effective strikes. The Nevada experiment does suggest however, that
public sector dispute resolution through arbitration can be consistent
both with effective bargaining and with political responsibility.
Grodin, Arbitration of Public Sector Labor Disputes: The Nevada Experiment, 28
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 89, 102 (1974).
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4.- Voluntary Binding InterestArbitration
The search for finality in the collective bargaining process
ends at the doorstep of binding interest arbitration. Loosely speaking, binding interest arbitration is equivalent to factfinding with
a binding report. By late 1975, 19 states authorized voluntary binding interest arbitration; that is, arbitration to be initiated by both
parties."' Use of jointly requested arbitrators to resolve collective
bargaining impasses, however, has been infrequent in both the
public sector27 and the private sector. 5 Considering the normal
resistance of public managers to the arbitration concept, their
unenthusiastic response to the invocation of voluntary binding
arbitration is not surprising.
State statutory provisions regarding jointly requested interest
arbitration vary, with limitations on the subject matter to be arbi-

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §

70120 (Deering 1970) (transit workers);

CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN. § 7-472 (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); Conn. Pub. A. No. 75-566,
§ 7 (Appendix Pamphlet 1976) (state employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1613
(1975) (transportation workers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1310 (1974); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 89-11(b)(3) (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 328a (Smith-Hurd
1966) (transit workers); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-13(c) (1975) (teachers); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 22-6-4-11(h) (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (Supp. 1976); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4322(q) (Supp. 1975) (public employees except teachers); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(4) (Supp. 1976) (university employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
150E, § 9 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69(3) (Supp. 1976) (public employees
except charitable hospital employees); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1614(9) (Supp.
1975) (public employees except nurses and professional engineers); NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 288.200(6) (1975) (local government employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.2
(Supp. 1976), referring to Pub. L. 1941, ch. 100, § 7 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:13A-7 (1965)); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(d) (McKinney 1973); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 548.7 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, municipal employees, police); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (Supp. 1976) (public employees except firefighters
and police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-9 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-9.4-10 (1968) (municipal employees except firefighters, police, and teachers);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (state employees, state college
employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (municipal employees).
.7 P. STAUDOHAR, supra note 77, at 83. Much of the public sector experience
with voluntary interest arbitration has occurred in the transit industry. See

generally Barnum, From Private to Public: Labor Relations in Urban Transit, 25
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 95 (1971).

21 It has been noted that only about 2 percent of collective bargaining agreements in the private sector provide for interest arbitration. F. ELKOu= & E. ELKOURI, supra note 152, at 7.
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trated being quite common. 2 9 Also, legislated criteria for use by
the arbitrator in rendering his decision are gaining favor [Note: to
be discussed under compulsory interest arbitration], and, sometimes, coordination of arbitration and budget-making deadlines is
mandated.2 41 As with grievance arbitration, legislation on interest
arbitration should address itself to the possibility of either enforcement or appeal of the arbitral award.
Voluntary arbitration of interest disputes is limited to the
issues contained in the submission of the parties. When the parties
have been unable to bridge the gap between bargaining positions,
they may wish to submit unresolved contractual issues to the
arbitrator because of political (using the arbitrator as a scapegoat)
or practical (avoiding a test of strength) reasons. For either reason,
labor and management are seeking a finality to collective bargaining unobtainable through mediation or factfinding efforts. Yet,
"indiscriminate use of 'interests' arbitration is to be avoided ....
In particular, parties who abdicate to arbitrators the responsibility
of writing the bulk of the collective bargaining agreement risk
2
serious disappointment. '
5.

Final-Offer Arbitration

An intriguing and promising form of collective bargaining
impasse resolution is final-offer (either-or) arbitration. Whereas in
conventional interest arbitration the arbitrator has wide latitude
in fashioning a contract based upon statutory criteria and the merits of the situation, in the final-offer format the arbitrator must
select contractual provisions from the two offers of the competing
parties. To date, only five states have enacted such legislation,
giving the arbitrator choices between the following: The entire
package as proposed by either side; 22 the entire package of either
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1310 (1974) (excludes wages and salaries);
§ 965(4) (Supp. 1976) (excludes salaries, pensions,
insurance matters-municipal employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804
(Supp. 1976) (excludes provisions requiring enactment-public employees except
firefighters and police); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.3-12 (1968) (excludes matters
requiring expenditures of money-teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.4-13 (1968)
(excludes matters requiring expenditures of money-municipal employees except
firefighters, police, and teachers).
240 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-472(a) (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees).
24 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 152, at 53.
242 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.742-.756 (1975 Replacement Part); Wis. STAT. ANN.
21

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
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party and the factfinder's report;2 13 item-by-item as proposed by
either party;2 " item-by-item as to economic issues defined by the
arbitrator.2 4 5 In Minnesota, the two sides must submit their final
offers as to contractual areas of disagreement to the Director of
Mediation Services, who renders a decision thereon.241 A variation
of the total-package choice has been codified in Eugene, Oregon,
where each side may submit two final offers. 27 An analogous process to the Eugene ordinance may exist in mediation-arbitration
(med-arb) when the parties tailor multiple contractual offers to
suit the mediator-arbitrator.
As with other forms of interest dispute resolution, the arbitrator is given a statutory framework of criteria within which to make
his decision [Note: to be discussed under compulsory arbitration]. Further, the parties limit the issues to be decided by the
arbitrator by the nature of their offers, which may or may not be
confined to the issues in dispute. Where final-offer arbitration involves a single issue such as wages, the total-package concept is
ideally suited to the task. 21 Where, however, a number of proposed
contractual items, particularly non-economic items, are in dispute, the item-by-item approach is much better. 29 Typically, in
§§ 111.77(4), (5) (1974, Supp. 1976) (municipal employees).
245 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9 (1976), referring to MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
150C, §§ 1-16 (1976).
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22(3) (Supp. 1976).
215 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(38) (1975) (firefighters, police).

The statutory mandate to the Director of Mediation Services is as follows:
"The director shall determine the matters not agreed upon based upon his efforts
to mediate the dispute." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69(5) (Supp. 1976) (public employees except charitable hospital employees). Exactly what form of final-offer
arbitration is authorized by this statutory section is a matter of interpretation.
20 Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden-Death" in Eugene, 27
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 186, 192 (1974). The Eugene, Oregon, statute is patterned
after a Nixon administration proposal for the transportation industry. See Note,
National Emergency Disputes in the TransportationIndustry:An Analysis of Final
Offer Selection as a Solution to the Problem, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 115-16 (1973).
"High-low arbitration" is the term attributed to the Eugene style of final-offer
arbitration.
248 For a private sector example of the utility of final-offer selection as to wages
see Seitz, Footnote to Baseball Arbitration, 29 ARm. J. 98 (1974).
211 One supportive view of the item-by-item approach states:
In the case of a multi-issue dispute involving a number of noneconomic as well as economic issues, the job of the arbitrator is much more
difficult. Not only are the criteria for noneconomic items like the grievance procedure, seniority, and union security less clear, but each finaloffer involves trade-offs between the various issues with each party trying
214
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this latter situation the arbitrator must select the more (most)
reasonable offer in light of statutory criteria."' Other nuances of
the final-offer process involve how the offers are made and altered,
with various methods including the following: "[E]ither by presenting the arbitrator with the positions of the parties, on the basis
of their prior negotiating record, without further hearing; or by
holding a post-negotiation hearing before a tripartite arbitration
board, during the course of which the parties might be allowed to
modify their positions prior to final decisions;" '' or by mandating
period of time after the arbicontinued negotiating for a specified
12
begun.1
has
procedure
tration
So far, the assessment of how well final-offer arbitration works
is cautiously optimistic. 2 3 The premise upon which final-offer
arbitration functions is that public employee labor unions and
public management will be compelled to adopt reasonable bargaining positions since arbitrators will select the more (most) reasonable final offer. Thus, where one party's offer is unrealistic, the
other party's final offer will prevail. The rub comes when the final
offers from both sides are unreasonable, for then the arbitrator is
to present the most reasonable combination of proposals. In such a situation, it becomes difficult for the arbitrator to justify his final-offer selection. Yet, in final-offer arbitration, where compromise by the arbitrator
is not possible, justifying or rationalizing the arbitration decision is especially important. Unless the arbitrator is able to rationalize his selection,
acceptance of final-offer awards by the public and the parties may be in
jeopardy.
Nelson, Final-OfferArbitration: Some Problems, 30 AB. J. 50 (1975). Thus, the
problem of acceptability is minimized where the arbitrator can choose between
each item of an offer instead of between each offer as a whole.
The Indianapolis experience with total package final-offer arbitration demonstrates that arbitrators loathe accepting or rejecting all of the proposals from either
party and desire greater flexibility. Witney, Final-OfferArbitration:The Indianapolis Experience, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 20, 23 (1973).
2 Limiting the arbitrator to selection of the most reasonable final offer is a
concept first advocated in relation to the total package final-offer concept ("selector
method"). Stevens, Is CompulsoryArbitration Compatible with Bargaining,5 IND.
REL. 48 (1966). See also Garber, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector, 26
ARB. J. 226, 232 (1971) ("most reasonable" concept should be applied to final-offer
arbitration).
21 Grodin, Either-OrArbitration for Public Employee Disputes, 11 IND. REL.
263 (1972).
2 E.g., Eugene, Oregon.
See Howlett, supra note 77, at 34 (Michigan); Long & Feuille, supra note
247, at 203 (Eugene, Oregon); Nelson, supra note 249, at 58.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss1/4

74

Kincaid: Resolving Public Employment Disputes: A Guide for West Virginia

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTES

stuck on the horns of a dilemma. Alternatively, pehaps both labor
and management representatives may attempt to second-guess the
arbitrator and gear their proposals to what will be acceptable to
the neutral. Finally, there is some risk that the item-by-item approach to arbitrating contracts may not bear a sufficient element
of risk to the parties (compare the total-package approach) to spur
voluntary compromises toward reasonable bargaining offers. Beyond these generalizations, the nascent state of development of
public sector experience with final-offer arbitration has prompted
more theoretical analyses than case studies; the verdict as to finaloffer arbitration has not yet been rendered.24
6.

Compulsory Binding Interest Arbitration

The search for a substitute to public employee strikes and for
finality in the collective bargaining process has led 11 states to
adopt compulsory binding interest arbitration, applicable after a
bargaining impasse has been reached, with invocation of the
process either being mandated or occurring automatically at the
behest of either party.25 Criticism has been voiced of the insistent
use of the expression "compulsory" arbitration since interest arbitration "is simply a process of dispute settlement directed by a
One author concludes the following:
The adoption of final-offer arbitration on a trial basis by additional
states and municipalities seems desirable. The final-offer procedure not
only protects the public from the damage and inconvenience caused by
public employee strikes but it minimizes the adverse effect of arbitration
on contract negotiations. In addition, limited experience indicates that
the procedure can be used successfully by parties with little collective
bargaining experience.
Nelson, supra note 249, at 58.
2 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b) (1972) (police, firefighters, detention and hospital employees); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:890(B), (E) (Supp. 1976) (transit workers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees-excludes salaries, pensions, insurance); NEB. Riv. STAT. § 48-819 (1974); N.Y.
CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.8 (Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§
28-9.1-7 to -11 (1968, Supp. 1975) (firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.2-7 to
-11 (1968, Supp. 1975) (police); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 9-14A-2 to -19 (Supp.
1976) (firefighters, police) [declared unconstitutional in Sioux Falls v. Firefighters
Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975)]; VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (Cum.Supp.
1976) (firefighters, police); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 41:56:450-:480 (Supp. 1975)
(uniformed services); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-269 to -271 (1967 Replacement Volume) (firefighters).
2'
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legislature";?" nonetheless, the term is sufficiently useful to be
adopted here. Another definitional qualification of "compulsory
binding interest arbitration" is that the process 2is binding only
after all appellate remedies have been exhausted. 1
Experience with compulsory binding interest arbitration is
largely of recent vintage, although there has been some long term
use of the mechanism in the United States"' as well as in foreign
countries.21 Evidence of the impact of legislated contract arbitration on reducing the incidence of strikes, 201 inflating or deflating
Howlett, Contract NegotiationArbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. CIN.
L. REV. 47, 53 (1973). Howlett states: "The word 'compulsory' is unfortunate; when
that word appears to describe legislated arbitration, the reasoning process of many
city officials and union representatives disappears." Id.
257 Howlett describes the divergent statutory approaches toward providing appeal from the arbitration award. As of 1972, some states granted no appeal (Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wyoming); three states listed fraud and
collusion as grounds for appeal [Maine (also, erroneous ruling or finding of law),
Vermont (also, error of law not concerning the admissibility of evidence), Wisconsin]; other states provided for normal civil action appellate channels-circuit court
to supreme court (Nebraska, South Dakota); and Michigan provided a rather comprehensive appeal provision with review limited to the local circuit court. Id. at
69-70.
In 1920 Kansas enacted a compulsory arbitration act, which set up a court
of industrial relations for disputes in industries affecting the public interest. A
similar interest arbitration court in Nebraska was modified in 1969 to apply to
public employment disputes. See Good, Public Employee Impasse Resolution by
Judicial Order: The Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations, 2 J. LAW & ED. 253
(1973). The National War Labor Board of World War I settled over 20,000 interest
disputes, which traversed practically the entire range of collective bargaining issues. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 152, at 52. Shortly after the end of World
War H1,a handful of states established compulsory binding interest arbitration or
related measures for public utilities, although such measures had to fall if in conflict with the LMRA. In 1963 Congress enacted its first peacetime compulsory
arbitration statute, which statute dealt with railroad diesel firemen, and followed
with a 1967 statute relating to the railroad shopcrafts dispute.
"' The most extensive experience with compulsory binding interest arbitration
is the 60-plus years of its use in Australia. See H. NORTHRUP, CoMPULsoRY ARBrTRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR DispuTEs 35-44 (1966). British Columbia has used the compulsory binding interest arbitration process since 1937. See
Feuille, Analyzing Compulsory Arbitration Experiences: The Role of Personal
Preferences,28 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 432 (1975); Thompson & Cairnie, Compulsory
Arbitration: The Case of British Columbia Teachers, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 3
(1973). New Zealand is another country with some experience in this area. See
Howells, Causesand Frequencyof Strikes in New Zealand,25 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
524 (1972).
2" After investigating United States firefighter strikes occurring in the 19691972 period, one author concluded that 28 strikes had taken place but that none
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"
the size of public employee wage increases,26
' or inhibiting collective bargaining" is tentative at best. In order for compulsory binding interest arbitration to dampen the growing proclivity of public
sector unions to strike, legislated arbitration has to serve the functions of a strike. That is to say, arbitration needs to act as a
powerful impetus to concession and compromise in collective bargaining in order to create a sense of urgency in negotiations and to
impose direct costs of disagreement upon the parties. 63 Indeed,

had occurred in jurisdictions with compulsory arbitration statutes. Wheeler, An
Analysis of Fire Fighter Strikes, 26 LAB. L.J. 17, 18 (1975). The experiences of
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have also been favorable, revealing few
police and firefighter strikes. Anderson, supranote 170, at 1019-20; Howlett, supra
note 256, at 63-64. The major problem with equating preliminary positive conclusions about compulsory binding interest arbitration with success of the process is
that this dispute resolution mechanism has been tested largely with police and
firefighters, who, presumptively, are not prone to strike. Bowers, The Dilemma of
Impasse Procedures in the Public Safety Services, 28 ARB. J. 167, 171 (1973). In
Australia, most authorities agree that legislated arbitration has not eliminated
strikes in the public sector. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 152, at 19. Yet,
the use of this process in British Columbia probably has averted a rash of public
teacher strikes. Thompson & Cairnie, supra note 259, at 14. A dramatic exception
to the general trend in avoidance of police strikes through compulsory binding
interest arbitration is the Montreal police strike of 1969.
21I A study which compared Michigan police and firefighter salaries
determined through negotiations or through compulsory arbitration between 1969
and 1972 showed no significant difference between the two methods in terms of
mean salaries and rates of salary increase produced. Bezdek & Ripley, Compulsory
Arbitration Versus Negotiations for Public Safety Employees: The Michigan
Experience, 3 J. COLLECTIvE NEGOTIATIONS 167 (1974); accord, Howlett, supra note
256, at 64.
2 The early years of compulsory binding interest arbitration in Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Michigan tend to demonstrate a chilling effect on collective bargaining. Such effect, if any, however, appears to be warming in later years. Anderson, supra note 170, at 1020-22; see Howlett, supranote 256, at 57-61; Loewenberg,
Compulsory Arbitrationfor Police and Firefightersin Pennsylvaniain 1968, 23 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 367 (1970). The evidence regarding British Columbia is mixed,
although collective bargaining has not atrophied. Thompson & Cairnie, supra note
259, at 12-13. Minnesota's experience with binding interest arbitration for charitable hospitals has demonstrated that the 30-year-old statute may even have
strengthened collective bargaining. Howlett, supra note 256, at 60.
The fear is that, in the face of compulsory binding interest arbitration,
negotiating parties will desert good faith bargaining and, in order to save face or
for other reasons, foist upon the arbitrator the unenviable task of writing the contract from scratch. The arbitration process was never intended for that purpose but
only for resolving disputes.
213 Bowers, supra note 260, at 174; Stevens, supra note 250, at 40. One survey
of Rhode Island police unions and public employers revealed that both sides favored
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some public employee unions have made the argument that compulsory binding interest arbitration is the quid pro quo for their
promise to refrain from exercising their de facto (not de jure) right
to strike. 6 '
Giving arbitrators (and factfinders) unfettered discretion in
deciding public employment interest disputes creates the unwelcome risk of arbitrariness. Consequently, legislated criteria to
guide the arbitrator (and factfinder) in formulation of a decision
are appropriate. The most frequently observed public and private
sector guides for use in interest arbitration are the following: Comparison of prevailing practices (i.e., wages and fringe benefits)
within appropriate geographical areas, comparison of peculiarities
of employment in regard to other trades and professions (particularly as to police and firefighters), cost of living, living wage,
maintenance, of take home pay, productivity, ability of the employer to pay the costs of the award, past practice and bargaining
history of the parties, effect of the award on departmental practices and policies, other factors normally considered by arbitrators
(and factfinders), public interest, and changes in any of these circumstances during the arbitration (factfinding) proceedings.
One will observe that these criteria represent substantially the
same factors considered by the negotiating parties. The advantage
of interjecting a neutral third party into the picture is that a measure of objectivity is obtained, or so it would appear. There is a
deep-rooted suspicion, however, that the neutral third party is less
concerned with applying criteria to his decision-making than with
promoting acceptability .of the award and advancing his own sense
of equity about the situation. 65' Perhaps acceptability and equity
as determined by the arbitrator are what state legislatures desire
in interest arbitration, for the nebulous nature of legislative crilegislated arbitration rather than the use of strikes essentially for these reasons.
Overton & Wortman, Compulsory Arbitration:A Strike Alternative for Police, 29
ARB. J. 33 (1974).
21 Jerry Wurf, president of AFSCME, takes this position in direct opposition
to the stance of George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO. AFSCME reprint of a
newspaper article by columnist Clayton Fritchey (date and source unknown).
2'5Doering, Impasse Issues in TeacherDisputes Submitted to Fact Finding in
New York, 27 ARB. J. 1, 13-15 (1972); cf. Wheeler, Is Compromise the Rule in Fire
FighterArbitration, 29 ARB. J. 176 (1974), for the conclusion that arbitrators and
factfinders usually do not adopt intermediate bargaining positions but accept either
the union or the employer's proposal.
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teria undoubtedly promotes broad discretion in an arbitrator's
decision-making. A legislative body which wishes certain factors to
be predominant in the resolution of interest disputes must say so
if its wishes are to be fulfilled. 2"1And where a legislature seeks to
reduce the arbiter's traditional discretion, legislated criteria
should be specific and avoid the use of catch-all provisions.26 On
the other hand, the use of broadly stated criteria, according to one
view, can evoke diverse expectations and create uncertainty in the
minds of the parties as to the outcome of
the award, thereby en268
couraging vigorous collective bargaining.
Determination of wage increases offers an illuminating example of the complexities and problems encountered when legislators
define compulsory interest arbitration criteria. Using the formula
developed by David Ross, 269 an arbitrator would compare an ex2"8 The public employer's ability to pay the costs of an award was made the
preeminent concern in Nevada's factfinding statute [factfinding can be binding].
NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200(8) (1975) (local government employees). The statute
reads in part as follows:
Any factfinder, whether acting in a recommendatory or binding capacity,
shall base his recommendations or award on the following criteria:
(a) A preliminary determination shall be made as to the financial
ability of the local government employer based on all existing available
revenues as established by the local government employer, and with due
regard for the obligation of the local government employer to provide
facilities and services guaranteeing the health ....
(b) Once the factfinder has determined in accordance with paragraph (a) that there is a current financial ability to grant monetary benefits, he shall use normal criteria for interest disputes regarding the terms
and provisions to be included in an agreement in assessing the reasonableness of the position of each party as to each issue in dispute. The fact
finder's report shall contain the facts upon which he based his recommendations or award.
Id.
I27 The "normal criteria" phrase of the Nevada statute is a catch-all provision.
Id. The prior Michigan statute, after enumerating various criteria, added the general criterion: "[sluch other factors . . . which are normally or traditionally taken
into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment ....
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(39)(h) (1975). That same section contains
the anomalous provision that the arbitration panel shall base its award upon factors
listed, in the statute "as applicable"; hence, the neutral panel may ignore one or
more of the legislated criteria. Klapper, Legislated Criteriain Arbitrationof Public
Safety Contract Disputes, 29 ARa. J. 117-18 (1974).
2I Stevens, supra note 250, at 48-49.
2" Ross, The Arbitration of Public Employee Wage Disputes, 23 IND. & LAB.

REL. REV.

3 (1969).
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penditure for a given service in one community with expenditures
for the same service in other communities in the state.270 The
subject of arbitration would be the relative effort of the community
in utilizing fiscal resources, taking into account the total resources
available and the community's need for a particular service. This
approach would exclude the cost of another service desired by the
community (except in emergencies) from consideration of the community's ability to pay and would focus on personnel expenditures,
producing a resource utilization ratio. The second element of this
wage analysis, available tax resources, would be the same as the
potential tax base per unit of need for these taxes, e.g., potential
tax resources per public school pupil. In rendering a decision as to
wage increases, the arbitrator would rank state communities as to
resource utilization ratios and available tax resources and would
award a wage increase if the community in question ranked below
the median in the statewide distribution of resource utilization but
27
above the median in distribution of resources available. '
Ross catalogues several problems with this approach to arbitration of wage disputes. 27 A more fundamental consideration,
270 The comparative expenditures factor is used because it is relied upon heavily by arbitrators and factfinders. See Pegnetter, supra note 213. For an argument
that the psychological force of equitable comparison of wages is the most important
factor in wage determination see D. Ross, TRApE UNION WAGES 49-53 (4th ed. 1956).
'7'

Ross, supra note 269.

Difficulties in Ross' approach are threefold. First, there is some difficulty
in defining the potential tax base, including various adjustments for valuations of
income or property, since the tax base could be considered as consisting of the
property tax, a mixed assortment of taxes, or the total income of the community.
Moreover, communities may be able to export their tax burdens to varying degrees
by a levy, the incidence of which falls on outside residents, necessitating adjustments to the tax base such as exclusion of the commercial base. More importantly,
governments do not obtain revenues only by general taxes, and such devices as user
taxes should be imputed to the tax base. However, these problems are surmountable with adequate data.
Second, the measurement of the varying amounts of public need for a service
is difficult because the need concept is riddled with ambiguities. Assumptions of
the appropriate unit for measuring need must be made where heterogeneous rendition of services exists and even though each individual's service consumption leads
only to nominal reduction in other individuals' consumption of the same service.
Nevertheless, attendance data may be a fair measure for educational services, and
labor inputs a fair measure for police and firefighter services.
Third, an arbitrator by necessity must exclude nonessential expenditures from
the ability-to-pay criterion and rest this judgment on his assessment of the requirements for adequate quality of service, using as guides both technical evidence of
production efficiency and evidence of past and present practices.
"'
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beyond the technical feasibility of the wage arbitration concept, is
whether this type of decision more properly belongs to legislative
bodies. The arbitrator may be viewed as an agent of the governing
body in the sense that he has been assigned the task of making
legislative decisions; consequently, the question of illegal delegation of legislative authority comes into play. In rebuttal, the lawful refrain is that no illegal delegation of legislative power exists
where specific standards to guide the arbitrator's judgment have
been enacted. 2
And what of sovereignty? If an arbitrator decides that a governmental unit is not fully utilizing its available tax resources,
requiring some sort of tax increases, or if he finds that wages are
more essential than alternative governmental expenditure plans,
requiring a reordering of fiscal priorities, has not the arbitrator
24
encroached on traditional concepts of governmental sovereignty?
Granted, the arbitrator leaves to the legislative body the decision
of which taxes to increase or which expenditures to cut, but the
underlying decision to increase taxes or cut expenses already has
an arbitrator asbeen made by the neutral third party.2 5 Should
26
sume this essentially legislative function?
"I The illegal delegation of legislative authority argument and other juristic
theories attacking the constitutionality of collective bargaining statutes which possess legislated arbitration provisions have failed. For a thorough review of relevant
cases see Anderson, supra note 170, at 1015-18; Howlett, supra note 256, at 54-57.
2"I For a lengthy and rambling attack on the scholarly trend favoring legislated
arbitration (as well as on public employee unionization and public sector collective
bargaining) see Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining, 10
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 25 (1974). Petro's concept of sovereignty is the "undivided
and unchallengeable power to perform the functions it [the government] assumes
or has allocated to it by its constituents." Id. at 66. "Between sovereignty and
compulsory public-sector bargaining there can be no reconciliation, no viable harmony. One or the other must give way." Id. at 71-72.
275 There is some authority supporting an arbitrator's decision which requires
governmental units to raise taxes to fund employee wage increases. For a collection
of cases on the subject see Anderson, supra note 170, at 1015-18; Howlett, supra
note 256, at 54-56. Numerous public employment arbitration awards have required
governmental units to pay wage increases out of available funds over the assertion
by the public employer of its inability to pay. For a number of these cases see
F.

ELKOURI

& E.

ELKOURI,

supra note 152, at 776-78.

"I One negative response to legislated arbitration is as follows: "Arbitrators are
seldom equipped to weigh the interests of government employees against the full
array of claims on the public treasury. Legislators are elected in a democratic
society to make such evaluations of the public welfare and priorities." D. BOK & J.
DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

337 (1970). For a somewhat more
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Other intricacies of compulsory binding interest arbitration
could be explored, but such discussion is unnecessary here."' The
essential legislative decision to be made in opting for public sector
legislated arbitration is whether the potential benefits of strike
avoidance and finality in the collective bargaining process outweigh the loss of legislative authority to exercise normal discretion
in financing and ratifying collective bargaining agreements and
the potential chill exerted on collective bargaining by legislated
arbitration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Public sector employment relations in the United States are
rapidly changing. As shown by the diverse nature of the state
collective bargaining statutes explored in this paper, states are
fulfilling their roles as the social laboratories of the American
body politic. Each state legislature has made a judgment of how
best to balance philosophical ideals and pragmatic considerations,
employer and employee desires, and interests of the public constituency. If recent legislative activity is a proper gauge, now is the
time for reassessment by West Virginia legislators of the basic
assumptions which form the underpinning of West Virginia public
employment relations.
Pressure upon West Virginia legislators from representatives
of public management and public employee unions will be intense
when collective bargaining statutory proposals are made. How
much influence the public at large will have in this political thicket
is an unanswered but perhaps decisive question."' Due to the comeclectic approach to this issue see Horton, Arbitration,Arbitrators,and the Public
Interest, 28 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 497 (1975). In his incisive article, Horton states
the following: Political democrats are more concerned about the process of labor-

management relations decision-making than about the nature of those decisions;
political accountability is lessened by legislated arbitration; arbitrators are inherently political actors; arbitration decisions are among the most significant of political decisions; delegation of legislative authority to nongovernmental identities is
commonplace, making the unlawful delegation argument sound anachronistic or at
least futile; too many arbitrators are not equipped to resolve the types of competing
bargaining issues; thus, the perception of arbitrators as nonpolitical experts may
be misleading. Id.
21 See generally McAvoy, Binding Arbitrationof Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192
(1972).
11 A recent survey of 262 local governmental units throughout the United
States disclosed that
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plexities of designing prudent legislation, special legislative committees should study and prepare alternative public-sector collective bargaining bills for consideration by the legislature as a whole.
Hopefully, this paper will make that difficult job easier.
the public policy environment is more important in determining bargaining outcomes than actual bargaining statutes . . . . This is not to say
that statutes are irrelevant; on the contrary, statutes probably have a
leveling influence, because agreements in states with bargaining statutes
tend to be more homogeneous than those in states without laws.
Gerhart, Determinants of BargainingOutcomes in Local GovernmentNegotiations,
29 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 331, 340 (1976).
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